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Prosecuting*
Irving Younger**
Every federal judicial district-there are ninety-one of
them plus three for the territories-has a United States Attorney, and every United States Attorney has assistants, but to be
an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York is to be a touch above the rest, or so Assistant
United States Attorneys for the Southern District of New York
have always believed. Because the Southern District of New
York includes Manhattan, it gets a good deal of the country's
major litigation. Lawyers practicing and judges presiding in the
Southern District of New York tend, on the average, .to surpass
their colleagues elsewhere in respect to acumen and energy.
Similarly distinguished above their competitors in other parts
of the country are the criminals who ply their trade in the
Southern District of New York. What goes on in the courtrooms of the Southern District of New York seems somehow to
be weightier, more imposing, and frequently more eccentric
than what goes on in the courthouses of the other districts. In
the midst of it all, representing the United States of America in
every civil lawsuit brought by or against the federal government and prosecuting every criminal case filed in the Southern
District of New York, is the office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Assistant United
States Attorneys in that office see themselves as unique, incomparable with any other group of young lawyers, Knights of the
Round Table sworn to lives of honor, swords drawn to do battle
for justice, whose numbers over the years have included the
likes of Felix Frankfurter and Thomas E. Dewey.
When I joined it, the office was divided into two divisions,
one for civil cases, the other for criminal. Assistants in the civil
division did more varied work than those in the criminal; assistants in the criminal division tried more cases than those in the
* © 1989 by Judith T. Younger. This excerpt is from Chapter Six of
Professor Younger's unpublished autobiography, Some of My Life.
** Late Marvin J. Sonosky Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School.
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civil. My ardor for courtroom conquest was moderated neither
by experience nor by judgment, and I asked to be assigned to
the criminal division. I was.
The office did not have a separate appellate unit. Each assistant handled the appeal in any case he had tried, writing the
brief with one other assistant, usually senior to him, and making the oral argument on his own, all under the modest logistical supervision of the chief appellate attorney.
On the day I became an assistant, the chief appellate attorney was awaiting the arrival of the appellant's brief in United
States v. Stone," an appeal from a sentence of eighteen months'
imprisonment imposed in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York on January 8, 1960, following a trial which resulted in a conviction on both counts of an
indictment charging Stone with concealing assets from a
trustee in bankruptcy and with making a false oath in a bankruptcy proceeding. When the brief arrived, it would have been
logged in and the appeal assigned in normal course to the assistant who had tried the case.
Appellant served his brief a few days later, but the Government's normal course was no longer a possible course. The assistant who had tried the case had been injured in an
automobile accident and was going to be confined to his bed for
many weeks. What to do? Find a substitute for him, of course,
and let the substitute handle the appeal though he hadn't tried
the case. Who could take on such an assignment, which would
be on top of the existing work-load of whoever got it? Someone
with a light load. Was there an assistant with a light load? Yes.
Who? Me, with a load of zero because I'd become an assistant
only a few days before. So the Stone appeal became my initial
assignment in the United States Attorney's office, which is how
it happened that I argued my first appeal before I tried my first
case.
An older assistant worked with me on the brief. We found
writing it a tricky job, principally because Stone was represented by Archibald Palmer.
Archie (as everyone called him) was short, globular; and of
a green-brown complexion. Not much given to dressing with
care, he appeared in court looking rather like an upright
Galapagos tortoise in a street beggar's second-best weekday
suit. Indoors or out, except when the judge was actually on the
1. 282 F.2d 547 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S. 928 (1960), reh'g denied,
365 U.S. 825 (1961).
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bench, Archie wore a black Borsalino with brims extending no
less than ten inches past his ears, a hat a Mafia chieftain might
have hesitated to wear lest he frighten his consiglieri and buttonmen. Archie's voice was that of a bull elephant in musth,
and his legal skills, so far as we law review editors in the
United States Attorney's office could see, nil. Incoherence was
his style, confusion the consequence of whatever he said. He
seemed to do no research. If he needed an authority, he'd cite
one or another of the Southern District's celebrated cases
whether or not it had anything to do with the point in contention. His trial method was to spout words the way an open fire
hydrant gushes water until he got what he wanted or until a
judge with a voice louder than Archie's told him to shut up and
sit down..
All of which made it very difficult for my collaborator and
me to pinpoint the target at which we were supposed to aim.
Reading the record and Archie's brief on appeal, we couldn't
quite put our finger on the issues he had raised. I suppose that
what we did finally was figure out the issues we would have
raised were we representing the defendant and then respond to
those issues. The upshot, I suspect, is that poor Michael Stone
got more help from us, his prosecutors, than from his own lawyer. Unless, that is, his own lawyer intended us to do precisely
that.
Stone sold dresses, conducting business through a corporation of which he and 'his wife were officers. On June 24, 1955,
the corporation filed a bankruptcy petition, and on November
17, 1955, a trustee was appointed. On February 1, 1955, the
business had 816 dresses on hand. Between that day and the
day the petition was filed, 13,658 dresses were received from
manufacturers. Of this total of 14,474 dresses, Stone could account for 12,608. Concealment from the bankruptcy trustee of
the balance of 1,866 dresses or their proceeds was the gist of the
indictment's first count.
Between early 1954 and March 1955, Stone's wife, Anita,
had made advances to the corporation totalling $13,480. The
Government claimed that the corporation had repaid $5,220 in
the year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The petition, sworn to by Michael Stone, listed repayments of loans by
the corporation in the preceding year, but omitted the repayments to Anita. This omission was the gist of the indictment's
second count.
My collaborator and I saw two major problems in the case.
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First, while the evidence of the missing 1,866 dresses was uncontroverted, nothing showed that Stone still had the dresses
or their proceeds in his possession either on June 24, 1955, the
date the petition.was filed, or on November 17, 1955, the date
the trustee was appointed. On what basis then could a jury
have concluded that Stone had concealed assets from the bankruptcy trustee, as the first count charged? Second, at trial
Stone testified in his own defense about the missing dresses.
On cross-examination, when he was impeached with arguably
inconsistent testimony he had given the grand jury, Archie
leapt to his feet demanding access to the minutes of all of
Stone's grand jury testimony. Judge Levet, who was presiding,
said, "I don't know of any rule of law that requires that."
Archie responded by launching into a discussion of the trial of
Alger Hiss. Judge Levet cut him short with a forthright, "The
application is denied." The trouble was that the application
should have been granted.
A technical solution to each of our problems occurred to
my collaborator and me. With respect to the first, we urged a
rebuttable presumption- that a thief continues to possess property he has stolen, an idea we teased out of United States v.
Olweiss,2 a case in which the Second Circuit, in an opinion by
Learned Hand, seemed to assume the existence of such a presumption without saying so. With respect to the second problem, our position was that Archie's application to inspect the
grand jury minutes was too confused to satisfy Rule 51, Federal
Rules of CriminalProcedure,which requires a litigant to make
known the grounds of the relief he seeks, and that, even if the
application should have been granted, the error was harmless.
Oral argument was set for June 10, 1960. A few days
before, Archie notified the clerk that he would submit appellant's side of the case on his brief.. I was disinclined to forgo my
first chance to stand before a court and hear myself talk. (Moving my friend's admission the preceding January hardly
counted.) I told the clerk that I would argue.
On the morning of the 10th, I was seated in one of the
leather armchairs scattered for lawyers' use around the well of
the Second Circuit's courtroom on the seventeenth floor of the
United States Courthouse. Judge Lumbard presided; on his
right, Judge Waterman; on his left, Judge Friendly, just beginning his ninth month on the court. The Stone case came second
on the calendar.
2. 138 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.1943).

1989]

FEDERAL PROSECUTION

The lawyers in the first case were finished. They shuffled
up their papers and vacated the long counsel table placed parallel to the bench and about six feet in front of it. "United States
against Michael Stone," intoned Mr. Fusaro, the Clerk of Court,
from his perch between the table and the bench.
"Ready for the Government," I said, moving up to the
table.
Mr. Fusaro turned to the judges. "Your Honors," he said,
"appellant in this case submits on his brief."
"Very well," Judge Lumbard replied. "We'll hear from the
Government." He paused and said, "Judge Hand will preside
over this argument." With that, Judge Waterman got up,
opened the door set into the wall behind the bench, and disappeared through it. The door remained open. Judge Lumbard
moved from the middle chair to the one Judge Waterman had
vacated. Through the open door came Learned Hand, slowly
moving to the middle chair on the two crutches made necessary
by the arthritis from which he suffered in his old age. Once
seated, with nothing but his head and shoulders visible above
the bench, he looked sixty, not the eighty-eight he was.
In those latter years of his career, Judge Hand read every
brief filed in the Second Circuit and would participate in a case
if it caughthis interest. Perhaps the citation of Olweiss was the
feature of Stone that explained his appearance on the bench.
Whether or not it did, there he was. I paid no attention to
Judges Lumbard and Friendly. I really wasn't aware of them.
I knew only that I was to argue my first appeal before Learned
Hand.
I got up and stood at the lectern. "May it please the court,"
I said. "My name is ...

."

Before I could say what it was,

Judge Hand asked me a question. I don't remember the question and I don't remember my answer. The truth is that I remember nothing of the next half-hour. During the argument, I
was in a kind of ecstasy which blotted out any recollection of
what had occurred while I was in it. I came to as Judge Hand
was leaving the bench, Judge Waterman was returning, and
Mr. Fusaro was calling the next case. No longer behind the lectern, I was standing beside it, pressing myself against the edge
of the table as if trying to get nearer the court.
JTY3 was still clerking for Judge Weinfeld, who had sent
3. Judith T. Younger, wife of Irving Younger, and a professor of law at
the University of Mfinnesota Law School.
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her to the Second Circuit courtroom to watch. She told me that
my argument had consisted entirely of a catechism by Hand.
Judges Lumbard and Friendly had said nothing and, apart from
my responses to Judge Hand's questions, neither had I.
The court's opinion came down on July 18, 1960. It was
unanimous, and Judge Friendly wrote it. As to the first count,
Judge Friendly said, the presumption of continuing possession
was enough t'o get the Government's case to the jury, but the
failure to give defense counsel the minutes of defendant's grand
jury testimony was error. Judge Levet knew what defense
counsel was talking about, so Rule 51, FederalRules of Criminal Procedure,was satisfied, and the error wasn't harmless. As
to the second count, there was no error, for the defendant's
grand jury testimony involved only the vanishing dresses, not
the undisclosed loan repayments. Since the sentence had been
eighteen months on each count concurrently, no new trial was
necessary. Stone would go to prison on the second count, not
the first.
A week or two later, Archie filed a petition for rehearing
in which he argued, so far as I could make out, that an examination of the corporation's financial records showed that the
undisclosed loan repayments had in fact never been made and
hence the bankruptcy petition wasn't false. My response for
the Government was succinct: this was an argument that
should have been made to the jury, not to the Second Circuit
after affirmance of the conviction. Judge Friendly agreed.
Writing for the panel, he said that the contentions advanced in
the petition for rehearing "concerned an issue of fact properly
for the jury.

' 4

Archie petitioned for certiorari. On December 19, 1960, the
Supreme Court turned him down, but he came close. Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas would have
granted certiorari. Short just one vote, Archie petitioned the
Supreme Court for rehearing. His petition was denied without
comment or dissent.
That was the end of the line for Michael Stone, I thought.
I sent Archie a notice fixing a day for Stone to report to the
United States Marshal to begin serving his sentence. A week
before that day, Archie made a motion for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. It was clear that his
newly discovered evidence consisted of the corporation's finan4. Stone, 282 F.2d at 553.
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cial records, exactly the evidence that had been before the jury
at the trial, but now carefully analyzed as they had not been
then. The records appeared to show, as Archie explained them
to Judge Levet, that the corporation had repaid no loans to
Anita Stone. "This is not newly discovered evidence," said
Judge Levet. "It's newly discovered argument, and you should
have discovered it and made it to the jury at the trial. It comes
too late. Criminal cases have to end sometime, and now is the
time for this one. The motion for a new trial is denied. The
defendant is ordered to surrender to the Marshal one week
from today. Further, I certify that any appeal from this order
would be frivolous, and I will not entertain an application for a
stay or for a continuance of bail."
Judge Levet's last sentence may have had some impact on
Archie. He made no application to Judge Levet or to the Second Circuit for a stay or for bail. Instead, in early May 1960,
Michael Stone surrendered to the Marshal and was sent to the
federal prison in Danbury, Connecticut, to serve his sentence.
What Archie did was to file a notice of appeal from Judge
Levet's denial of his motion for a new trial.
Archie's brief to the Second Circuit laid out his new analysis of the corporation's financial records. I wrote the Government's brief alone. It was a page and a half long and said that
the defendant was making evidentiary arguments which should
have been made to the jury. On June 8, 1961, the case was submitted to a panel consisting of Judges Lumbard, Goodrich (visiting from the Third Circuit), and Friendly.
A few days later, my office telephone rang. I picked it up.
"Irving," said the voice at the other end, "this is Judge
Friendly." It was the first time a judge had ever called me, and
I found myself short of breath.
"Yes, your Honor," I managed to say.
"I want to talk to you about this Michael Stone matter,"
the judge said. "You know, when it was before us the first
time, I had real doubts about it, but Judge Hand finally convinced us."
"Yes, your Honor," was all I could get out.
"Well, I've been reading Palmer's brief, and, Irving, I'm
troubled. I think the Government may have convicted an innocent man."
"Yes, your honor," from me again.
"So what I think you ought to do is consent to a new trial.
We'll enter an order saying just that-new trial on consent -
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and it will have no adverse precedential effect on the Government. Then try Stone again, and maybe you can convict him,
but do it fair and square."
I had taken courses in law school with legal philosophers; I
had spent two years at Paul, Weiss, working for the ablest lawyers I'd ever known; by the day Judge Friendly called me, I had
been an assistant for over a year, sizing up judges, talking to juries, dealing with the FBI; but nothing prepared me for this. I
paused for a moment and. tried to figure out what I thought.
My response, I decided, should be strictly lawyerlike.
"No, your Honor," I said. "I can't do that. I've got an obligation to my client, and my client has won this case. I don't
think it would be proper for me to give away my client's
victory."
"All right," said Judge Friendly. "No one can force you to
consent. We'll just have to decide the appeal."
Decide it they did. The per curiam opinion was filed on
June 20, 1961. Its cadences are Judge Friendly's:
The facts alleged in the affidavits attached to defendant's notice
of motion for a new trial dated April 29, 1961, if believed by a jury as
they might well be, would seriously undermine any basis for convicting defendant on Count 2 .... Recognizing the limitations upon the
scope of our review of dn order denying a new trial, ... we think nev-

ertheless that under all the circumstances the denial here was erroneous. The new trial will, of course, include Count I of the indictment,
the conviction on which was previously held to be subject to reversal
for failure to furnish defendant with a copy of the'grand jury minutes
5

The Government sought neither rehearing nor certiorari.
Michael Stone had already served almost two months in prison.
That seemed enough, and we never retried him.
Reflecting on it all, I realize now that Judge Friendly had
tried to teach me a lesson I needed to learn. Good lawyers love
a technical point, but they never forget that there are times
when a technical point must give way to something else, the
something else Judge Friendly, an unsurpassed technician of
the law, had in mind when he called me that morning in June
and asked me to consent to a new trial for Michael Stone.
Just as the office did not have a separate appellate unit, it
had no separate training program for new assistants. None of
us had ever tried a case as of the time of swearing in. We all
possessed a certain dexterity with the books, but the sorts of
5. United States v. Stone, 291 F.2d 396, 395 (2d Cir. 1961).
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things a lawyer learns from books are different from the sorts
of things a lawyer needs to know when he tries a case. The tradition was that Assistant United States Attorneys learned how
to do it by doing it. To lessen the shock of the initial plunge,
we were encouraged to spend our first few days in the office
watching a senior assistant at work.
I walked around the corridors looking for someone to
watch, and I found him. Kevin Thomas Duffy, who had been in
the office for a year or two, was in the final stages of getting
ready for a trial. I asked him whether I might sit in his office
and look on. "Sure," he said.
The defendants were charged with running an operation
whereby, for a fee, they took civil service examinations for
others. Kevin had already prepared the Government's principal witnesses. In those last couple of days before trial, he was
wrapping up loose ends, including the preparation for giving
testimony of a man I shall call Allen Peters.
Peters was in his late twenties. He worked for the post office as a mail handler. Among his co-workers was one of the
defendants. Peters had taken his daughter to the park one
morning on his day off. In the park, he saw his co-worker, the
defendant, talking to a man Peters didn't recognize. He wasn't
close enough to hear what they were talking about. All he
could say is that they talked. Peters' testimony would take no
longer than three minutes, and defense counsel would probably
have no cross-examination.
Kevin explained to me that Peters would be his first witness. The case was fairly complex, and, in complex cases, he
said, you sometimes start with a witness who's a "teaser." The
teaser's testimony is brief and easy to understand, but the jury
doesn't quite see what it adds up to. Their curiosity is aroused,
which spurs them to pay close attention to the rest of the Government's case.
The trial started on the following Monday. Kevin invited
me to sit with him at counsel table, and I did.
The jury was selected. "So that's how it's done," I thought.
Kevin delivered his opening statement to the jury. I'd never
heard an opening statement before. Each defense lawyer delivered an opening statement. I listened now, not as a perfect
novice, but as something of a critic.
The judge said to Kevin, " You may call your first witness,
Mr. Duffy."
"The Government calls Allen Peters," said Kevin.
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Peters was waiting in the witnesses' waiting room. A deputy marshal went to get him. There was silence in the
courtroom.
Kevin poked me in the ribs with his elbow. "You examine
him," he whispered in my ear.
Kevin was wise not to tell me too far in advance that I was
about to make my debut. I got up and started to walk the fifteen feet from counsel table to the lectern. The muscles
around my knees seemed to have lost their tensility, and my
breath came in gasps. My heart pounded so hard it hurt my
teeth. I realized that I was close to being very sick.
The deputy marshal ushered Peters into the courtroom.
"Raise your right hand," said the clerk, who swore Peters to
tell the truth and told him to be seated.
I had made it to the lectern, where I held on tight lest I fall
down. Thirty feet in front of me was the witness stand, a plain
wooden chair on a platform elevated an inch or two off the
floor. Peters was in the chair.
Struggling to catch my breath, hoping I'd be heard above
the pow-pow-pow of my heart, I looked at Peters and got ready
to ask, "What is your name?"
Before I could say the words, Peters gulped. His eyes
opened wide as saucers, they turned up to the ceiling, and, in
one smooth movement, he slid off the chair and onto the floor,
out cold. I had struck a witness unconscious before asking him
a single question.
It's probably a good thing Peters passed out. One of us was
going to go, and, when Peters went first, he saved me. The lawyer for the United States of America ought not to faint dead
away in front of the jury.

Courtroom 318 was the calendar part for all criminal cases.
Upon being indicted, a defendant was arraigned there. If he
pleaded guilty, the case was adjourned to give the Probation
Department time to prepare a presentence report and, on the
adjourned date, still in 318, he'd be sentenced. If he pleaded
not guilty, the case was adjourned while both sides got ready
for trial. On the adjourned date, the judge presiding in 318 assigned the case to some other judge in some other courtroom.
Defense counsel and the assistant immediately went to that
other courtroom, where the other judge gave them the actual
date and hour for starting the trial. The procedure today is en-
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tirely different, but the cumbersome system I've described was
adequate for the case loads of 1960.
After about three months as an assistant, I had a full complement of cases of my own. In most of them, the defendant
pleaded guilty. In a few, in order to permit additional investigation, I had agreed with defense counsel to an adjournment to
the late summer or early fall. In only one case had the defendant pleaded not guilty and asked for no more than the usual interval to prepare for trial. The adjourned date was a date in
late June. For that week, it turned out, the judge presiding in
318 was Judge Weinfeld.
Having stayed with him for a second year, JTY was still his
clerk. As the law clerk's husband, I wasn't an unfamiliar figure
around Judge Weinfeld's chambers. Whenever the Judge
worked latd, which was frequently, JTY worked late with him,
and, when I came to chambers to take her home, the three of
us ended the evening with coffee and tales, mainly told by the
Judge, about days of yore in the Southern District of New
York.
The case was called on the trial calendar. "Ready for the
Government," I said.
"Ready, your Honor," said the lawyer for the defendant.
Judge Weinfeld put his head down so that no one in the
courtroom could see his face. "I'm assigning this case to myself," he said. "We'll start next Monday at 10 a.m. in courtroom
605."
The Judge knew that it was my first trial. The charge was
forging an endorsement on a United States Treasury check, the
evidence was straightforward, and the defendant's guilt, I
thought, was as plain as could be. But the jury, after deliberating for an hour and a half, acquitted.
Judge Weinfeld asked me to see him in chambers. Because
he'd told JTY to stay out of the courtroom, she hadn't watched
the trial and couldn't tell me how I'd done. The verdict was the
only comment I had on my performance, and it was no rave.
In chambers, the Judge asked how I felt about the trial.
"I felt fine until the verdict," I said. "I don't see how they
could have found him not guilty."
"Neither do I," said the Judge, "but that's what juries are
for. You'tried the case well and you shouldn't worry about anything else. As a matter of fact, you're fortunate to have lost
your first trial."
"Fortunate? Why fortunate?" I asked.
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"Because now you're not likely to develop a notch-in-thebelt mentality. Since you've lost your first, you know you can't
ever have a perfect score, which means you won't start keeping
score to begin with. Keeping score is a dangerous thing for a
prosecutor. A prosecutor shouldn't care what the verdict is.
The United States wins every time a case is well tried by its
lawyer. The outcome is irrelevant. Aim for one thing and one
thing only. Try your cases well, that's all."
If Judge Weinfeld said I'd tried my first case well, I was
ready to believe him. But mere personal satisfaction wasn't my
sole concern. I had found it exhilarating to make of the disparate and miscellaneous details presented in the investigative report something coherent, to organize them in accordance with
the requirements of law as a musician organizes notes in accordance with the requirements of sonata form. Trying the
case, I'd given shape to the chaos of reality, turned it into
drama, with a plot, characters, dialogue, a climax and a denoument, a cunning representation in the courtroom of the transaction outside the courtroom which constituted the subject
matter of the case.
Standing in front of the jury, delivering my opening statement, I'd spoken fluently. I'd known what to say. The flow of
language had been steady, copious, and to the point. Here, in
the courtroom, I'd discovered a place where words were commanded by art. Here then was the place for a poet. This was
the place for me. If there was anything in the law for which I
was fit, it was the trial of cases.
My decision to leave Paul, Weiss and become an Assistant
United States Attorney had been a lucky one. The United
States Attorney's office was preeminently an office where
young lawyers could try cases, and for the next two years I
tried them. Taking no vacations, working seven days a week
and most nights, I tried twenty-five cases and argued five
appeals.
The interest of one of those twenty-five cases lay, not in
the trial, which was next to nothing, but in the oddity of
human nature the case laid bare.
At the time I became an Assistant United States Attorney,
there lived in Crompond, New York, a village several miles
north of New York City, a successful and intelligent proprietor
of hardware stores named Victor Sharrow. Managers bought
and sold the merchandise; accountants kept the books; and
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Sharrow, as president, found that the business made few demands upon his time and energy. Looking about for something
to occupy him, he decided to study law.
He went to.the New York University School of Law, where
he attended classes full-time, bringing to his school work a concentrated steadiness beyond that of the typical law student,
perhaps because he was twice the age of the typical law student. Taking constitutional law, for example, Sharrow did not
rest content with merely reading the opinions in the case book;
he read the Constitution itself. And in the Constitution he
made what was to him a remarkable discovery.
The fourteenth amendment, he found, contained more
than the Due Process Clause quoted in the opinions. After
speaking of due process in the first section, the amendment
went on in section 2 to provide as follows:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-

ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State .... But when the right to vote at any election...
is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twentyone years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged ....
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in

the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
6
State.

This excited Sharrow. He had learned that "shall," in a
legal document, denotes a command. Then section 2 meant
that it was compulsory for the representation in the House of
Representatives of any state that disenfranchised its adult male
citizens to be proportionally reduced. Since everyone knew
that, for decades, some southern states had been making it difficult or impossible for their black citizens to vote, section 2 of
the fourteenth amendment was no mere curiosity. The events
which would trigger its application had occurred. But had the
section ever been enforced? Sharrow went to the library. The
answer, he learned, was no. From the day of the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment to the present, no state had had its
representation in the House of Representatives reduced on account of the disenfranchisement of its black adult male citizens.
Ever an enthusiast, Sharrow had found his cause. He devoted all of his hours outside the classroom to the study of the
second section of the fourteenth amendment and the consequences of its nonenforcement. After graduation from law
school, he did not bother to take the bar examination. Instead,
6.

U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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he threw himself into the writing of a book arguing that, in
view of the mandatory language of section 2, the failure to enforce it rendered the House of Representatives illegally constituted, which being so, no federal statute enacted since the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment was enacted validly. He
entitled his book, UnconstitutionalCongressionalGovernment,
and, when every publisher to whom it was submitted rejected
it, Sharrow paid a printer to run off several hundred copies. He
sent the first of them to Chief Justice Earl Warren with a note
asking the Chief's assistance in vindicating the fourteenth
amendment.
The Chief graciously replied, thanking Sharrow for the
book, stating that he had read it with interest, and pointing out
that, as a federal judge, he could assist only if a case or controversy were presented to him.
Taking the Chief's last comment as a hint, Sharrow now
went looking for a case or controversy. In connection with the
decennial census, the Bureau of the Census was distributing to
as many of the nation's householders as it could find a form entitled, "Advance Census Report for the 1960 Census of Population and Housing." The form asked questions about the
persons living in the household of the person filling out the
form, from the answers to which the Census Bureau would
tabulate the population of each state. The form contained no
questions designed to ascertain whether anyone was being denied the right to vote. Sharrow, as head of his household, received an Advance Census Report. He knew at once that the
necessary case or controversy had fallen into his lap. All he
had to do was wait for the enumerator to call, and, on April 6,
1960, she did.
Her name was Irene Miller. A housewife who lived in an
adjoining town, Mrs. Miller listened as Sharrow told her that
he had neither completed the form nor would supply the requested information orally. He explained that the House of
Representatives was unconstitutionally apportioned because
the adjustment required by section 2 of the fourteenth amendment had not been made, and, inasmuch as the census form did
not ask about twenty-one year old male citizens who had been
denied the right to vote, the statute providing for the taking of
the census was unconstitutional.
Mrs. Miller's training did not extend to anything so vivid as
this. Nonplussed, she left, returning a week later to ask Sharrow one last time whether he would answer the questions.
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Sharrow replied that he 'had not changed his mind in what he
wanted to do." What's more, Sharrow had written and now
gave to Mrs. Miller an affidavit justifying his behavior in these
words:
As a person who is deeply devoted to civil rights and the upholding of
the Constitution of the United States, on April 6, 1960, I specifically
and personally refused to answer the census enumerator, irs. Irene
Miller, of Crompond Road, Croton-on-Hudson, New York, in order
specifically to raise a constitutional case and controversy to determine
whether the census law was constitutional.

Not long after, Sharrow was indicted for violating Title 13,
U.S. Code, § 221(a):
Whoever, being over eighteen years of age, refuses... to answer,
to the best of his knowledge, any of the questions... submitted to
him in connection with any census... shall be fined not more than

$100 or imprisoned not more than sixty days, or both.7

This provision, in essentially this form, had appeared in the
original census statute enacted by the First Congress. No one
in the history of the republic had ever before been indicted
under it for refusing to be counted. Sharrow was the first.
His case was assigned for trial to United States District
Judge Thomas F. Murphy. Sharrow waived a jury and represented himself. The Government's case consisted in Mrs.
Miller's testimony and various items of judicial notice. Sharrow's defense consisted in himself. He took the stand and, at
great length, expounded his views. The census statute, he said,
did not provide for the comprehensive enumeration required by
the second section of the fourteenth amendment and hence he
was not required to supply the information demanded by the
1960 census form. Judge Murphy asked Sharrow how he
thought the census should have been conducted. Sharrow replied that the enumerator should have inquired of each adult
male citizen whether he was being denied the right to vote and
that, since the question was not asked, proper figures couldn't
be obtained for apportioning the House of Representatives in
accordance with section 2 of the fourteenth amendment. This
flawed taking of the census, Sharrow concluded, deprived him
of equal protection and of the right to be governed by a constitutionally elected Congress.
As Sharrow stepped down from the witness stand, Judge
Murphy said that he did not need to hear summations. "Are
you ready for my decision," he asked Sharrow. Sharrow replied
that he was.
7. 13 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1982).
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Without a pause, Judge Murphy said, "I find you guilty."
Turning to me, he asked, "Do you see any need for a probation
report?"
"No," came my answer.
"Mr. Sharrow," said the judge, "if you're ready, I'll impose
sentence right now."
Sharrow was seated at the counsel table. "I'm ready," he
said.
Judge Murphy looked over his half-glasses at Sharrow.
"Stand up," he said. Sharrow stood up. "I sentence you," intoned the judge, "to pay a fine of $100."
Sharrow said nothing. He walked around the counsel table
and stood where lawyers stand for a side-bar conference. From
his right trouser pocket he withdrew a roll of twenty dollar
bills. With his left hand he flicked five of them onto the bench.
"That won't be necessary," said the judge. "I'm paid every
two weeks. Just give it to the clerk on your way out."
Sharrow did so. He accompanied the clerk to the clerk's
office and, while waiting for the clerk to write out a receipt,
filed a notice of appeal.
Sharrow appeared in the United States Court of Appeals
on May 2, 1962, and argued his own case. I handled the government's end of the appeal. Chief Judge Lumbard and Judges
Waterman and Friendly made up the panel. On September 28,
1962, Judge Waterman's opinion for himself and Judge
Friendly came down.
Irrespective of the Fourteenth Amendments mandate the Congress,
in the present state of the law, is not required to prescribe that census-takers ascertain information relative to disfranchisement .... The
reduction of a state's representation in the House of Representatives
as provided by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment has been described as a "political question" of the kind that has been considered
unsuitable for judicial determination... Whether this classification is
to survive the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Baker v. Cart
...need not be determined by us in this case. The denial of the suffrage is a complex question, and it has been thought inappropriate to
use census forms in order to obtain information relative thereto ....
We hold that there was nothing unconstitutional in the omission from
the census form of a question relating to disfranchisement. 8

A few days later, Chief Judge Lumbard filed a concurring
opinion:
There is no language in the Constitution which directs that the Con8. United States v. Sharrow, 309 F.2d 77, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1962) (citations

omitted).
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gress designate the census questionnaire as the means to determine
disfranchisement ....
I agree with Judge Waterman that the statute
under which Mr. Sharrow was convicted is constitutional. This is the
only question we are called upon to discuss.9

Sharrow filed a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court
denied it. He moved for rehearing. The Court turned him
down. At this point, Sharrow surrendered. He stopped fighting. The battle was over.
When Victor Sharrow abandoned the lists, section 2 lost its
only champion. To this day, there is no one to speak up for it.
A quaint corner of the Constitution, read only by the antiquarian, section 2 is of no consequence whatever. It's sad, though,
to think of what might have been.
For most of my cases in the United States Attorney's office, the trial itself, not the events preceding it, was the field of
1 ° for example, the backinterest. In United States v. Salazar,
ground facts were simple and unexceptional.
To become a regular employee of the United States Post
Office, one had to take and pass a Civil Service examination.
The questions posed were of the multiple-choice variety, the
answers to be marked on a sheet adapted to grading by computer. From January 18, 1958, through August 7, 1958, thirteen
such examinations were conducted by the Civil Service Commission in Manhattan and the Bronx.
At that time, minimal formalities were required of aspirants for appointment. A person desiring to take the examination picked up an application and an admission card at the
office of the Civil Service Commission. The admission card was
good for a particular examination, and the candidate had only
to present himself, the application, and the card at the specified
place and time. No identification was necessary.
Once seated, the candidate received the preliminary examination papers, consisting of a declaration sheet, a register card,
and a notice of rating. The candidate printed his name on the
declaration sheet and copied the declaration sheet's identification number on all the other papers, including the application.

Then the examination began. When it was over, the candidate
signed the certificate of honesty on the declaration sheet.
It came to be known at the Morgan Annex Post Office in
late 1957 and early 1958 that temporary employees who did not
9. Id at 80.
10. 293 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1961).
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qualify for Civil Service appointment would lose their jobs.
Many such employees found that they could not pass the examination. To their need, Max T. Salazar repeatedly responded.
One Anthony Travali paid Salazar $100 to take the examination for him. Salazar guaranteed a passing grade. Upon receiving a notice of failure, Travali complained to Salazar, who
lived up to his guarantee by taking and passing another examination in Travali's name. A handwriting analyst at the FBI laboratory determined that the handwriting on both sets of
examination papers was the handwriting of Salazar.
Salazar made similar arrangements with others-Caesar L.
Wilson, Dino A. Zaino, and Odilio Zaino, to name just three.
The FBI laboratory determined that the handwriting on the examination papers for all of these men was ihe handwriting of
Salazar.
Salazar's lawyer was Carson Dewitt Baker, a former judge
of the New York City Municipal Court. I knew nothing of him
except that he was dignified and friendly. The judge before
whom we tried the case was Gregory F. Noonan.
In my opening statement, I told the jury that the Government's case would consist mainly of the various sets of examination papers and the testimony of four witnesses-Anthony
Travali and Dino Zaino, who would recount their dealings with
Salazar, Postal Inspector Burke, who would describe the investigation he had conducted, and the FBI documents examiner,
who would demonstrate to the jury that the handwriting on the
examination papers was Salazar's. Baker waived his opening.
I called Travali and Zaino, both of whom testified as expected. Baker asked questions on cross-examination of Travali
intimating that Salazar was the "fall guy" for a ring of gamblers, usurers, and examination-takers operating in the Morgan
Annex Post Office. On cross-examination of Zaino, he suggested that Zaino and Salazar were personal enemies, having
once engaged in a fist-fight at work. Things seemed to be going
smoothly for both sides; things changed with the testimony of
the FBI documents examiner. As the witness explained his
conclusions with respect to the handwriting on the test papers,
Salazar leapt from his chair at the defense table. "That is a lie,
Your Honor," he cried. "I didn't write nothing like that in
there. I didn't take an examination for nobody but myself.
How can he stand there and lie like that?"
Baker pulled Salazar down into his chair. Judge Noonan
benignly remarked to Salazar that outbursts such as that would
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do him no good and cautioned the jury to disregard the defendant's exclamations as an understandable symptom of excitement and tension.
The Government having rested, Baker began the defense
by calling Salazar to the stand. He asked Salazar to describe
his duties as a postal employee, and Salazar balked.
Q. Now, during the year that you worked as a
temporary employee, what were your duties?
A. I did every kind of work in the post office, sir.
I did everything. You want to define everything?
Q. Well, you didn't act as postmaster, did you?
A. No, sir.
Q. So you didn't do everything?
A. Well, what I meant-I didn't do everything.
Baker attempted to get over this rough spot by
leading his client. (A lawyer "leads" a witness by asking questions that suggest the answer the witness
should give.)
Q. Did you route mail?
A. Idid.
Q. Did you work on the chutes?
A. Idid.
Q. Did you handle the mail?
A. I handled the mail.
Next, Salazar expressed some hesitancy about approximating
the date of his own Civil Service examination.
Q. After being at the Morgan Annex Post Office
for a year, you took the examination.
A. -That is about right, sir.
Q. Sir?
A. That is about right. I can't-I don't know
exactly.
Judge Noonan reassured him.
The Court: You don't have to give us the exact
date. Give us your best recollection.
Salazar: I can't, Your Honor. I would be making
it up.
The Court: I don't want you to make anything
up.
Salazar: That is just it. I don't want to make anything up. I want to tell the truth.
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The Court: That is why I say, I want to give you
a little leeway. Don't try to fix the date if you really
can't. In other words, don't go out on a limb and say it
was January 2, 1958. Say it was somewhere in the beginning of 1958, if that is your best recollection. Now,
do you understand what I mean?
Salazar: Yes, sir, I do.
The Court: I am trying to help you.
Salazar: Yes, sir, I understand that.
After some further questioning on peripheral matters,
Baker sought to elicit from Salazar a direct assertion that he
had had nothing to do with Government Exhibit 63, a slip of paper bearing Salazar's name and address, which Zaino testified
he had been given by Salazar. Salazar's answers were
equivocal.
Q. Now, I show you, sir, Government Exhibit 63.
What does it contain?
A. It contains a name, an address, and I believe a
phone number.
Q. It contains the name "Salazar"?
A. It looks like it.
Q. Did you live at 507 East 140 Street, Bronx,
New York?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have telephone number LUdlow 54206?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you write on this piece of paper?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you deliver this paper to anyone?
A. No, sir. I don't know if I did or not.
Judge Noonan tried to help.
The Court: Are you saying, Mr. Salazar, you may
have told somebody in the post office what your home
address was, and phone number, somebody who was
friendly with you socially, but it wasn't any of the men
who've testified here?
Salazar's reply was unappreciative.
Salazar: I'm not trying to say that at all. I would
like to put it in my own words. My phone number is
in the book and only my close friends at the post office
who weren't here at all-
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The Court: That is what I mean.
Salazar: No.
The Court: This may have originated as a result
of somebody who didn't testify here.
Salazar: No, sir.
The Court: Maybe he wrote it down and left it
behind. Is that what you mean?
Salazar: No, I don't mean that at all.
At this point, Baker took over from the judge, asking Salazar
whether he had heard the testimony of a Government witness
who had described how Civil Service examinations are administered. Salazar's answer must have taken Baker by surprise.
A. I don't believe I heard it, no. No, I don't believe I heard it.
Moving on, Baker elicited from Salazar an outright denial of
having taken an examination for any person other than himself
and an express contradiction of the testimony of the Government witnesses. Now Baker sought to develop the defense of
frame-up by asking Salazar to describe the fight he had had
with Dino Zaino.
Q. Tell us the circumstances under which you
had that fight with Zaino.
A. Well, I used to help fellows with-the other
employees and men already on the job with their exams. There was exams coming up, and we all used to
help them, just-it wasn't anything that would take a
long time. They had either a Civil Service exam review book or a plain exam practice sheet, and I think I
helped Mr. Zaino once or twice. And then he says, being that I know about this, why didn't I take the examination for him? I couldn't take no examination,
because I know what the consequences are. I couldn't
take an examination for nobody.
Suddenly breaking off his narration, Salazar sped
away on his own.
A. Let me add this, also being that I have never
been arrestedBaker tried to bring him back, admonishing Salazar to remain
seated and answer the questions put to him.
After some further colloquy, Salazar reverted to the tack
of refusing to admit that he had heard the testimony of a Government witness, despite Baker's reminder that Salazar had
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been in court throughout the trial. The most Baker could get
was a grudging "maybe" that the witness had testified.
By now, Salazar's direct examination had lost all momentum. Whatever his reasons, he had decided to refuse to give responsive answers even to Baker's most innocuous questions.
The jury had been looking on through all of this. Perhaps out
of fairness to Salazar, Judge Noonan intervened.
The Court: Let me ask you, Salazar-don't misinterpret my remarks, either you or the jury-but you
seem to be bearing a bit of a chip on your shoulder. I
mean, you feel you want me and the jury to believe
that all these people in the Post Office Department
and the United States Attorney's office and the postal
inspectors are in a gigantic conspiracy to frame you?
As Judge Noonan spoke, I realized that the jury was hanging on his every word and that the Court of Appeals might
view his remarks as something less than judicious. I stood up
and caught his eye. Motioning toward the jury, I shook my
head slightly from side to side, as if to say, "Not in front of
them, Your Honor." Judge Noonan paid no attention to me.
When Salazar responded to the judge's question, he dashed
whatever hope Judge Noonan may have entertained of resolving the extraordinary problem Salazar had himself created, for
Salazar grasped the opportunity to make overt his hitherto
merely implicit challenge to Baker's skill and probity. First, he
questioned Baker's decision to put him on the stand at the beginning of his case.
Salazar: There is a lot of things yet that haven't
been brought to light. Now, with no reflection on my
attorney, whom I have the highest respect for, plus
everybody here, I want to know now, sir, is it procedure to put the defendant on the stand before he calls
his witnesses?
Second, he suggested that Baker was withholding evidence.
Salazar: My lawyer has on his desk some evidence
which I gave him on my behalf.
Baker found himself in an apparently distressing position.
To come to his own assistance, he would necessarily have had
to impeach his client, running the risk of dissipating such
strength as the defense possessed. But if he did nothing, his integrity would remain impugned, while the jury might draw inferences adverse to Salazar or otherwise react unfavorably to
him. Judge Noonan might have thought that, in these circum-
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stances, he had an affirmative obligation to take charge, which
is what he did.
With regard to Salazar's attack upon Baker's decision to
put him on the stand first, Judge Noonan warned Salazar that
he was making a serious accusation.
The Court: Well, now, I think that that question is
clearly indicative of what I said, chip-carrying, only it
goes a little bit further. It is almost, Mr. Salazar, a
slanderous and libelous remark.
In view of Salazar's almost continuously insulting demeanor to
Baker, the judge's warning came a bit late.
Judge Noonan next tried to explain away Salazar's
conduct.
The Court: I really feel that perhaps you spoke as
a result of pique or the result of fear, and that seems
to be going through your mind, too.
The judge suggested to Salazar that he apologize. When
Salazar replied by declaring that the judge had misunderstood
his attitude, Judge Noonan-anxious to get on with the trialhimself apologized to Baker.
As to Salazar's accusation that Baker was withholding
favorable evidence, Judge Noonan listened to Baker's statement that the evidence in question was hearsay and therefore
inadmissible.
Baker: The defendant has some affidavits there,
and he doesn't know that I can't get affidavits into evidence. That is the problem.
The judge tried to explain matters to Salazar.
The Court: The evidence you say you have is in
the form of affidavits?
A. Yes, sir.
The Court: lMr. Baker, being a lawyer, knows
that he is not allowed to offer in evidence affidavits, to
be read in the course of a criminal case.
A. I didn't know that, sir.
The Court: You didn't know that?
A. No.
The Court: Well, you can't. I can tell you now
you may not, as a general rule, and specifically in this
case, offer affidavits. The persons who gave you affidavits could come and testify.
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When Salazar began to argue with him, Judge Noonan commented, "Well, there is no point in discussing it further. I see
we have a legal scholar on our hands."
My cross-examination followed:
Q. Mr. Salazar, take this pad and pencil. Will
you print at the top of the page your own name?
A. [Witness complies.]
Q. Then would you write your name?
A. [Witness complies.]
Q. Then write today's date. Today is September
30, 1960.
A. [Witness complies.]
Q. Have you written it out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then would you write it out in numbers,
ninth month, 30th day, 60th year?
A. Ninth month, 30th day, 60th year.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I hand you Government Exhibit 2
in evidence, a declaration sheet bearing the name of
Anthony Travali. Did you fill that out?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you or did you not take that examination
for Mr. Travali?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I am drawing a circle around
some of the printing which appears on this paper, Government Exhibit 2. Will you read to the jury exactly
what appears in that circle?
A. "NY"
Q. Read the periods, too.
A. "N period."
Q. Is there a period after the "Y"?
A. I don't see none there?
Q. You will agree there is none there?
A. I agree there is none there.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I show you Government Exhibit 5
in evidence. This is an application sheet that bears the
name of Anthony Travali. Did you fill it out?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you or did you not take that examination
for Mr. Travali?
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A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I am drawing a circle around
some of the printing which appears on this paper, Government Exhibit 5. Will you read to the jury exactly
what appears in that circle?
A.

"NqY

Q. Read the periods, too.
A. "N period."
Q. "Y"?
A. 'rT"
Q. Is there a period after the Y"?
A. I don't see none there.
Q. You will agree there is none there?
A. I agree there is none there.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I show you Government Exhibit
59 in evidence. This is an application sheet that bears
your own name. Did you fill it out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. This is the application sheet for your own
examination?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It's your own printing?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I've drawn a circle around some
of the printing which appears on Government Exhibit
59 in evidence, your own application sheet. Will you
read to the jury exactly what appears in that circle?
A. "N.Y"
Q. Is there a period after the
"?
A. No, sir.
Q. Just as there is no period after the '"Y" on
both of the Travali declaration sheets?
A. Right.
Q. Mr. Salazar, a few minutes ago you wrote and
printed some words and numbers on the top sheet of
this pad, didn't you?
A. That is right.
Q. Your Honor, I tear off the top sheet, ask that
it be marked Government Exhibit 81, and offer it in
evidence.
The Court: It will be received.
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Q. Mr. Salazar, here is Government Exhibit 2 in
evidence, a declaration sheet for an examination taken
in the name of Anthony Travali on January 18, 1958.
Did you fill that out?
A. No, sir.
Q. Mr. Salazar, do you see the date of the examination written on that declaration sheet?
A. I see it.
Q. What does it say?
A. It says, "1-18-58."
Q. How are the numbers separated?
A. By dashes.
Q. Not by diagonal lines?
A. Not by diagonal lines.
Q. Have you ever seen a date written in numbers
where the numbers were separated by diagonal lines?
A. I might have.
Q. When you write a date in numbers, how do
you separate the numbers?
A. I don't know.
Q. I show you Government Exhibit 81 in evidence, the sheet of your own writing. The last thing
you wrote on that page is today's date in numbers, isn't
it?
A. That's right.
Q. How are the numbers separated?
A. By dashes.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I show you Government Exhibit 5
in evidence, a declaration sheet bearing the name
Anthony Travali. Did you fill that out?
A. No, sir.
Q. Would you read to the jury the date of the examination as it appears on that sheet?
A. "3-6-58."
Q. The numbers are separated by dashes, aren't
they?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you take that examination?
A. No, sir.
Q. Mr. Salazar, I show you Government Exhibit
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27 in evidence, a declaration sheet. Whose name appears on it?
A. Caesar Wilson.
Q. What is the date of the examination?
A. It says 4-18-58.
Q. In numbers?
A. Yes.
Q. How are the numbers separated?
A. By dashes.
Q. Did you take that examination?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you fill out that paper?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Did you take an examination for Dino Zaino?
A. No,.sir.
Q. I show you Government Exhibit 31 in evidence, a declaration sheet. Whose name appears on
that paper?
A. Dino Zaino.
Q. What is the date of the examination?
A. 5-2-58.
Q. In numbers?
A. Yes.
Q. How are the numbers separated?
A. By dashes.
Q. Did you fill that paper out?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you take an examination for Odilio Zaino?
A. No, sir.
Q. I show you Government Exhibit 35 in evidence, a declaration sheet. Whose name is on that
paper?
A. Odilio Zaino.
Q. What is the date of the examination?
A. 7-30-58.
Q. In numbers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Separated by dashes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fill out that paper?
A. No, sir.
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I have no further questions, Your Honor.
After this, the case proceeded uneasily to a conclusion.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Judge Noonan sentenced Salazar to a year and a day in prison.
In the course of the skirmishing, Baker had expressed his
gratitude to Judge Noonan for his assistance: "I was in a most
embarrassing position. I didn't know what to do. I didn't want
to appear to let him down in front of the jury."
On appeal, however, Salazar had new counsel, who argued
in the Court of Appeals that Judge Noonan had improperly injected himself into the trial, making comments in the jury's
presence that could only have prejudiced .the jury against
Salazar.
I wrote the Government's brief. The gist of it was expressed in this paragraph:
We concede that the trial judge, during his lengthy exchange with
Salazar, used a turn of phrase or a sentence which, in the artificial illumination of afterthought, he might better have otherwise expressed.
To balance these few unstudied remarks, the record vouchsafes a series of instances in which the judge came to the assistance of a flustered and floundering defendant, a scrupulously impartial jury
charge, and, we submit, overwhelming evidence of guilt. So long as
this Court requires, not a perfect trial, but simply a substantially just
trial, there can be no warrant for reversal here.

The panel before which we argued the appeal was presided
over by Chief Judge Lumbard, himself a former United States
Attorney. Salazar's lawyer spoke. Then it was my turn. I'd
hardly stood up when Judge Lumbard was on me. "Mr.
Younger," he asked, "are you really going to try to support this
verdict?"
"Indeed I am," I replied. My argument was the argument
I'd made in the brief. Maybe Judge Noonan could've handled it
better, but the trial was basically fair, and that's all the law
requires.
The Court'of Appeals reversed Salazar's conviction and ordered a new trial. Judge Lumbard's opinion makes it clear that
the decisive factor in the reversal was that Judge Noonan was
prone to doing this sort of thing, and the appellate court had to
curb him. Said the opinion:
[Ilt is abundantly clear that the remarks of the judge were wholly
unnecessary; they were not called for by the defendant's conduct on
the stand. By attributing to Salazar the argument that the Post Office
Department and the United States Attorney's Office had joined together to frame him, the judge made Salazar's eventual fate at the
hands of the jury almost inevitable.... See the strikingly similar case
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of United States v. Woods [in which Judge Noonan had interrogated
Woods pretty much as he'd interrogated Salazar, with the result that
the Court of Appeals reversed Woods' conviction]. By maling gratuitous and unnecessary comments which sarcastically and relentlessly
discredited Salazar for questioning his counsels judgment, the judge
made Salazar's
defense seem contemptible and ridiculous in the eyes
1
of the jury. l

While we were before Judge Noonan, the thought had
crossed my mind that it was all a performance designed to subvert the trial and assure appellate reversal of the inevitable
jury verdict of guilty. The thought became something close to a
belief when the case was tried again, following the Court of Appeals' decision.
Judge MacMahon was the judge; I was the prosecutor; and
there was no defense lawyer. Salazar announced at the beginning of the trial that he would represent himself.
Because the prospective jurors hadn't yet been brought
into the courtroom, Judge MacMahon was free to question
Salazar about the prudence of his decision.
"You're not a lawyer, are you, Mr. Salazar?" he asked.
"No, sir."
"Have you ever tried a case?"
"No, sir."
"Have you ever seen a case tried?"
"Only my own, last time."
"Do you know the rules of evidence?"
"No, sir."
"The prosecutor, Mr. Younger there, does know the rules
of evidence, and he's tried a good many cases. Do you think
you're a match for him?"
"I'm not a match for him, your Honor, but I don't have to
be. No matter what Mr. Younger says, I'm going to be declared
innocent."
"How can you be so sure?"
"Easy, your Honor. The truth is I'm innocent."
"Well, you can take the witness stand and testify that
you're innocent. But I think Mr. Younger may have some
cross-examination for you, and there may be Government witnesses who say you're not so innocent after all."
" our Honor, Mr. Younger can't cross-examine me if I
don't testify."
11. Salazar,293 F.2d at 444.
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"That's right. But if you don't testify, you can't tell the
jury that you're innocent."
"I don't have to tell them, your Honor."
"You mean you've got witnesses other than yourself who
are going to say that you are innocent?"
"Yes, sir. Two of them."
"Mr. Salazar, under the rules of evidence, there are things
your witnesses are permitted to say and things they're not permitted to say. Let's make sure we don't have problems in front
of the jury. Why don't you give me some idea of the testimony
you expect from these witnesses of yours?"
"Yes, sir. They're going to testify that the jury in my first
trial found me innocent."
Judge MacMahon paused. I thought it best for me to say
nothing.
Further questioning by the judge established that Salazar's
defense was double jeopardy, that he'd been acquitted by the
other jury, and that, apart from this contention, he didn't dispute the Government's case. Accordingly, Judge MacMahon
suggested that the present jury be asked to decide only one
thing-what was the other jury's verdict? If they said the other
verdict was guilty, Salazar would be guilty in this case, and if
they said it was not guilty, Salazar would be not guilty. I
agreed. So did Salazar.
My case rested on the testimony of the court clerk who had
recorded in the official docket the verdict Judge Noonan's jury
had returned and of the stenographer whose notes showed that
the foreman had said, "We find the defendant guilty."
Salazar's two witnesses were friends of his who said that
they'd been in court when the verdict was returned and had
distinctly heard the foreman say, "Not guilty."
Judge MacMahon instructed the jury to determine what
the earlier verdict had been. Doubtless full of wonder at the
mysterious workings of the law, the jury deliberated for about
three minutes and returned to announce that, in their considered opinion, the earlier verdict had been guilty.
Judge MacMahon's sentence-the same year and a day, but
with immediate eligibility for parole-was remarkably light,
given that Judge MacMahon is not famous for an easy attitude
toward convicted defendants. The case ended there. Salazar
took no appeal from his second conviction. "Why should I," he
must have asked himself. "I came close to beating Civil Service, and I beat the courts hands down."

1989]

FEDERAL PROSECUTION

I tried most of my cases in the United States Attorney's office to juries, an experience that inspired a faith in them which
has stayed with me over the years. Like everyone else, jurors
make mistakes, but less frequently than do judges or lawyers.
Their collective ability to understand what a case is really all
about, to see some essential fact the lawyers may have missed,
to find a decent resolution of the controversy, is astonishing.
And "astonishing" is an accurate description of the jury's verdict on George Brown, as I shall call him, a man I prosecuted in
the summer of 1961.
Newspaper accounts of the sentencing described Brown as
an actor and model. He was neither. He was a homosexual
who was kept by a wealthy older man I shall call Norman
Miller.
Miller owned a large house in Westchester County, just to
the north of the New York City line. On the walls of that
house hung Miller's collection of paintings and drawings,
among the best in the country. Miller lived there with Brown
for several months, after which, having grown tired of Brown,
Miller announced one morning that he was leaving for Europe
the next day and that, when he returned in two weeks, Brown
was to be gone.
Miller did leave for Europe the next day, and, a few days
later, Brown moved out. On May 9, 1961, the day before Miller
was to return from Europe, Brown went to the house at a time
when he knew the housekeeper would be away. Letting himself in by the key he still had on his keyring, he removed from
the wall a large Degas pastel especially cherished by Miller.
Brown put it in the back seat of his car and drove to lower
Manhattan, where he proceeded to the office of a company specializing in the shipment of works of art and had the pastel sent
to himself at his parents' home, a bungalow on a dusty street in
a small town in southern Texas.
The housekeeper noticed the next day that the picture was
gone. She brought the loss to Miller's attention when he arrived from Europe, and Miller called the FBI. The FBI recovered the pastel in Texas. Brown was vacationing with friends
in New Hope, Pennsylvania. There the FBI found him. Upon
being asked whether he knew anything about the Miller burglary, Brown replied, "Yes, I stole the pastel." Asked why, he
said, "I was compelled to prove to myself my worth as a human
being."
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Brown was indicted for causing to be transported in interstate commerce property known by Brown to be stolen. He
pleaded not guilty by reason of temporary insanity. His psychiatrist testified that, at the time he took the painting, Brown
was suffering from "situational reactive mental agitation with
great anxiety and depression" and was both unaware of the nature and quality of his conduct and unable to tell right from
wrong.
My job, I thought, was to present the Government's case in
such a way as to focus the jury's attention upon the theft and
the great value of the thing stolen, pushing into the background
as much as I could the relationship between Brown and Miller,
the termination of which unquestionably supplied Brown with
a motive. I had to shape these events to make it the story of a
crime, not the tale of a lovers' spat. If the jury saw it as a
crime, they would convict. If they saw it as a lovers' spat, they
would acquit.
First, I decided not to call Miller as a witness. I told him,
in fact, to stay home during the trial. A courtroom confrontation between Miller and Brown would only emphasize to the
jury that these men had once been erotic partners. I proved
the disappearance of the pastel through the housekeeper's
testimony.
Second, to make the picture the heart of the case, not the
quarrels of Brown and Miller, I had a large wooden easel built
and set up, with the judge's permission, against the wall directly opposite the jury box. The day before the trial started, I
placed the pastel on the easel and covered it with a king-size
bedsheet I'd brought from home. When the prospective jurors
walked into the courtroom, that was the first thing they saw.
When the jury was sworn and seated in the jury box, they were
staring at it. When the housekeeper testified, I questioned her
as follows:
Q. Was May 9 of this year your day off?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Where did you go that day?
A. To New York, to visit my married daughter.
Q. Did you return that night?
A. No.
Q. When did you return?
A. I stayed over with my daughter and returned
the next morning.
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Q. When you entered the house the next mornig, did you notice something?
A. Yes.

Q. What?
A. The picture that had been on the living room
.wall near the piano wasn't there.
Q. Have you seen the picture since then?
A. No.
Q. Up to the present moment?
A. No.
Q. Would you recognize it if you saw it again?
A. Yes.
Q. Please step down from the witness stand and
go over to that object.
A. Yes. [Witness walks to covered easel.]
Q. Don't remove the bedsheet. Just look under it
at whatever the bedsheet is covering. Have you done
so?
A. Yes.
Q. Please return to the witness stand.
A. [Witness returns to the witness stand.]
Q. Do you recognize whatever it is the bedsheet
is covering?
A. Yes.
Q. What is it?
A. The missing picture.
I used the same line of questioning with the FBI agents
who had recovered the pastel in Texas and with the appraiser
who told the jury.the painting's worth in the market. (It isn't a
federal crime to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce
if the goods aren't worth more than $5,000. The Degas was.)
By the time I was done, the jurors were panting to see that
pastel. At the end of my case, I offered it in evidence. The
judge received it, whereupon I whipped off the bedsheet and, as
the jurors gazed upon it at last, I said, "Your Honor, the Government rests."
Finally, it was necessary to meet the testimony of Brown's
psychiatrist. Where a defendant raises the issue of insanity, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time he committed the crime. To
counter the testimony the jury had heard from Brown's psychiatrist, I had to put a psychiatrist on the stand in rebuttal, and I
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did. He was Richard Williams, as I shall call him, a psychiatrist
for about seven years who had examined Brown twice in connection with this case. Dr. Williams's opinion as to Brown's
psychiatric condition was "that it is quite evident on examining
him that his attitude and general behavior, his manner, are
consistent with his own history of many homosexual involvements. This is a large part of his mental content, also. And it
was my impression that he was describing himself very well in
saying that he was a practicing homosexual. It is definitely my
opinion that he is sane, that he is not psychotic. He is a homosexual, but he is not psychotic, and his intelligence is normal,
and the working of his nervous system is normal."
Dr. Williams went on to say that Brown undoubtedly was
in a state of emotional turmoil when he entered Miller's house
and stole the picture. The doctor and I proceeded as follows:
Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor, as to whether
this emotional turmoil that you have referred to would
have rendered Mr. Brown incapable of distinguishing
right from wrong?
A. I honestly think if I could answer that I would
be wiser than Solomon. Love upsets anyone, no matter
what kind and where. I think everybody has undergone that. I think Brown is as entitled to be upset by
it as the next citizen, but I don't know why more so.
Q. So in your opinion, Doctor, the emotional upset Mr. Brown was experiencing this past May was the
common lot of humanity?
A. Well, the homosexuality is not common, but
the emotion, the anxieties, occur in all kinds of situations, sooner or later, to almost everyone, I imagine.
There was nothing unusual in Brown's situation except
that the basic cause of his upset was homosexual. If
this were a heterosexual affair, there would be nothing
out of the ordinary about it. That it was homosexual
doesn't make it any different.
This last bit of testimony became the crux of my final argument to the jury:
What happened to George Brown is a commonplace of existence. If you're going to live in this vale of
tears, it's going to happen to you. Homosexual, heterosexual, whatever! The sex of Brown's lover is beside
the point. The point is that he'd had a disappointment
in love, and it happens to everyone--to you, to me, to
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Dr. Williams, even to the judge-and to some of us it
happens more than once, it happens over and over. It's
painful when it happens. You're upset, you're'distraught. Your heart may be breaking, and everyone
knows that's an awful thing to have to experience. But
it doesn't give you a license to steal! And that's exactly
the argument the defense asks you to buy. Because his
lover told him he didn't love him any more, he had a
right to steal an enormously valuable picture. Well, I
don't think you're going to tell him he had that right.
I think you're going to tell him that theft is wrong,
wrong, wrong, however much your lover has hurt you,
however much you want to hit back and hurt him,
hurt her.
I finished my argument around noon. The judge charged
the jury immediately after lunch, and by 2:30 the jury had begun to deliberate. The afternoon became the early evening-no
verdict, no question from the jury. At 6:30, the judge sent the
jury to dinner. They resumed deliberating at eight. Nine, ten,
eleven o'clock. The judge came down to the courtroom from
his chambers.
"Gentlemen," he said to defense counsel and me, "I won't
send the jury home or to a hotel until they ask to go. If they're
willing to keep at it this late, let's let them."
Midnight, one, two. At a quarter past two the jury announced that they had arrived at a verdict. The courtroom
filled quickly. A good many reporters were present, mainly out
of curiosity. Newspaper coverage of the trial had been virtually
nonexistent, perhaps owing to the papers' unwillingness to
print a story about homosexuality. (Times have changed.)
The verdict was guilty. As the jury foreman announced it,
Brown fainted. He came to in a few seconds and began to sob.
The judge discharged the jury. "Mr. Brown," he said, "I'm
worried about your state of mind and the possibility that you
may try to injure yourself. It's now 3 a.m. on Saturday morning. I'm going to remand you to the custody of the United
States Marshal, and you will be held at the Federal Detention
Headquarters until Monday morning, when I'll impose
sentence."
The marshal led Brown away. Defense counsel went along,
his arm protectively around his client's shoulder. The judge
left the bench, and I rushed out of the courtroom. Several jurors were in the lobby waiting for an elevator. I approached
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them and said, "Now that the case is over, I can talk to you and
you can talk to me if you like."
"O.K.," one of them replied.
"That was a long, tough deliberation," I said.
"It was."
"What gave you trouble, the psychiatrists' testimony?"
"Not at all. When we walked into the jury room and sat
down around the table, we agreed at once that there was nothing to this claim of temporary insanity. It was pure hogwash."
I paused. "Then let me ask you," I said, "what took ten
hours to decide?"
"Oh, you see," the juror responded, "we weren't going to
convict him if he did it out of spite. We don't want to condone
theft, but if Brown stole the pastel just to get even with Miller,
we weren't going to tag him with a federal felony conyiction.
But if he did it for pecuniary reasons, if he did it to make
money, then we were going to find him guilty. It took us all
that time to come to a unanimous conclusion that he did it for
money."y
"What was the basis of your conclusion? What evidence is
there that he did it for money?"
"Oh, it's there, even though you didn't talk about it in your
summation, Mr. Younger, and we had to figure it out for
ourselves."
'Tm sorry I let you down and I apologize, but tell me what
the evidence is."
"The FBI found Brown in New Hope, Pennsylvania,
right?"
"Right."
"So after Miller told him to get out, he lived in
Pennsylvania?"
"At least some of the time. The rest of the time he stayed
with friends in New York."
"We assumed that he did. But now, where did he ship the
pastel?"
"To Texas, at his parents' address."
"Yes, to his parents in Texas. Did he live there?"
"Then why did he send the pastel there?"
Since I'd never thought of this point, my answer was lame.
"I guess he wanted his parents to take care of it."
"What would his parents in that cow-town know about tak-
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big care of a Degas? And how would Brown ever have explained to them his suddenly coming into possession of a
picture worth a quarter of a million dollars?"
"Well, why do you think he shipped it to Texas?"
"To be able to take it easily across the border to Mexico.
And everyone knows Latin America is where you go to sell stolen art."
The elevator arrived, and I said good night to my ingenious
jurors.
On Monday morning, the judge took up the question of
sentence. It was clear to him, as it was to me, that Brown
wasn't an evil sort. With no great gifts of intellect or character,
he had come to New York and fallen in with people like Miller.
It was the social environment of New Yorkthat led to Brown's
troubles, and the way to relieve those troubles was to remove
him from New York.
"I sentence you," said the judge, "to the maximum, imprisonment for ten years." Brown tottered. The judge quickly continued. "But I suspend execution of the sentence and place you
on prbbation for the maximum, five years. This probation will
be unsupervised. You will not be required to report to a probation officer so long as you stay out of difficulties with the law.
There is a special condition to this unsupervised probation,
however. The special condition is that within one week you
leave New York and, for the five-year period of probation I've
imposed, you stay out of New York."
This was, in fact, a sentence of banishment, the only one I
know of in modem times. But the judge was a very wise man.
Brown took no appeal; he left New York; and I've heard he's
doing well in the new life he started elsewhere.
The Southern District of New York has been the scene of a
number of trials that were themselves political events. Hiss,12
3 and Dennis14 come instantly to mind. In this comRosenberg,"
pany, Seeger'5 may not stand out, but it had its points, and, in
any event, it was mine.
12. United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), appeal denied,
201 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953).
13. United States v. Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 204
F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
15. United States v. Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 303
F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1962).
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The Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of
Representatives came into being in 1938 and existed, under one
name or another, until 1975, when the House voted to abolish
it. In October 1947, the Committee held hearings in Los Angeles on Communist infiltration into the movie industry, hearings
that generated enormous news coverage and featured the refusal to testify of ten screenwriters and producers known as
"the Hollywood Ten." Four years later, the Committee returned to California for a second round, equally well publicized
but less spectacular than the first. In 1955, the Committee decided to turn its attention eastward, to the legitimate theatre
and the possibility of Communist subversion of the stages of
Broadway. It sent a subcommittee to hold hearings in New
York City, and before that subcommittee, on August 18, 1955,
appeared folk-singer Peter Seeger. He was asked ten questions
about his political affiliations, to which the following is typical
of his answers.
I am not going to answer any questions as to my associations, my
philosophical or religious beliefs or my political beliefs, or how I voted
in any election, or any of these private affairs. I think these are very
improper questions for any American to be asked, especially under
such compulsion as this.

At the request of the Committee, the full House of Representatives voted to cite Seeger for contempt of Congress and
asked the Department of Justice to indict him for that crime, a
misdemeanor which carries a penalty of one year in jail. Because the hearings had been held in New York, the proper
venue was the Southern District of New York, and there, on
March 26, 1957, the indictment was returned. It read as
follows.
The Grand Jury charges:
INTRODUCTION
The Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, having been duly created and authorized by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 601, Section
121(q)(1)(A)(2), (60 Stat. 828), and House Resolution 5, 84th Congress,
on or about the 8th day of June, 1955, pursuant to said authorization,
directed that an investigation be conducted of Communist infiltration
in the field of entertainment in New York.
Pursuant to said direction, in or about August, 1955, in the Southern District of New York, a duly constituted and authorized subcommittee of said Committee was holding hearings. In the course of said
hearings, and on or about the 18th day of August, 1955, defendant Peter Seeger, having been summoned by the authority of the House of
Representatives to give testimony, appeared as a witness before said
subcommittee and was asked certain questions pertinent to the ques-
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tion under inquiry which pertinent questions the defendant deliber-

ately and intentionally refused to answer.
The allegations of this Introduction are adopted and incorporated
into the counts of this indictment which follow, each of which counts
will in addition designate the particular pertinent question which was
asked of the defendant and which he refused to answer.

COUNT ONE
May I ask you whether or not the Allerton Section was a section
of the Communist Party?
COUNT TWO
Did you take part in this May Day Program under the auspices of
the music section of the cultural division of the Communist Party?
COUNT THREE
Did you sing this particular song on the fourth of July at

Wingdale Lodge in New York?
COUNT FOUR
Were you chosen by Mr. Elliott Sullivan to take part in the program on the weekend of July Fourth at Wingdale Lodge?
COUNT FIVE
Did you take part in that performance?
COUNT SIX
Have you been a member of the Communist Party since 1947?
COUNT SEVEN
Will you examine it please and state whether or not that is a photograph of you?
COUNT EIGHT
It is noted that the individual mentioned is wearing a military
uniform. That was in May of 1952, and the statute of limitations

would have run by now as to any offense for the improper wearing of
the uniform, and will you tell the committee whether or not you took
part in that May Day program wearing a uniform of an American
soldier?
COUNT NINE
Did you also teach at the Jefferson School of Social Science here

in the City of New York?
COUNT TEN
Are you a member of the Communist Party now?

Seeger pleaded not guilty a few days later. In May, his
lawyers moved for a bill of particulars wherein the Government would specify in detail the legal basis of the subcommittee's authority to hold hearings and ask the questions Seeger
had declined to answer. Their motion was granted. The Government's bill of particulars read as follows:
In addition to Public Law 601 and House Resolution 5, 84th Congress, which are pleaded in the indictment, the Government will offer
the following in order to establish the authority of a subcommittee of
the Committee on Un-American Activities to conduct, in August of
1955, in New York, an investigation into Communist infiltration in the
field of entertainment in New York, and the authority of the parent
committee to authorize such an investigation:

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:829

a) House Resolution No. 2, 84th Congress, First Session, January 5, 1955.
b) House Resolution No. 4, 86th Congress, First Session, January 7, 1959.
c) Rules of the House of Representatives for the 84th Congress.
d) Annual Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities for'1956.
e) An extract from the Journal of the House of Representatives
of January 13, 1955 and January,20, 1955, indicating the Constitution of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the
House of Representatives.
f) The minutes of a January 20, 1955 executive session of the
Committee on Un-American Activities adopting a resolution
empowering and authorizing the chairman to appoint subcommittees composed of three or more members, a .majority of
whom to constitute a quorum, for the purpose of conducting
any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to perform.
g) The minutes of the June 8, 1955 meeting of the Committee on
Un-American Activities which indicate that the Clerk was directed to proceed with the investigation of entertainment in
New York, a preliminary investigation having been authorized earlier.
h) Oral testimony as to an organizational meeting of the Committee on Un-American Activities in January 1955, at which
a preliminary investigation into Communist infiltration in
the field of entertaining in New York was authorized.
i) The full transcript of the Hearings of the subcommittee of the
Committee on Un-American Activities in New York on August 15, 16 and 18, 1955 (Parts VI and VII).
j) The minutes of an executive session of the Committee on UnAmerican Activities on June 27, 1956, at which a report of
facts relating to the refusal of Seeger, Sullivan and Tyne to
answer questions was reported to the Committee.
k.) House Reports 2918, 2919 and 2920 relating to the appearance
of these individuals before the subcommittee, and House Reports 634, 635 and 636, agreed to July 25, 1956, relating to the
certification of these reports to the United States Attorney.
1) Speaker's letters to the United States Attorney certifying the
contempts and transmitting the reports and resolutions.

After some further preliminary skirmishing, the case came
to rest. Defense lawyers are almost always content to let matters drag. They like to say that "the longer the whiskers on a
case, the likelier an acquittal," and Seeger's lawyers acted accordingly. The Department 'of Justice had done what the
House of Representatives asked-indict Seeger-and presumably was no longer under pressure to vindicate the Committee
on Un-American Activities. The hysteria of the early 1950sMcCarthyism, as we now call it-had crested in December 1954,
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when the Senate voted its censure of the Senator from Wisconsin. Whether the Department of Justice would just as soon
have proceeded no further, perhaps dropping the case altogether after a suitable number of years had gone by, I don't
kow. I do know that the Seeger file had been relegated to the
back of a drawer in a storage cabinet in the United States Attorney's office and that, as of the day I was sworn in, nothing
was happening in the case and nothing was contemplated.
In November 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected President.
In January 1961, leadership of the Department of Justice
shifted from William P. Rogers, the Republican Attorney-General, to Robert F. Kennedy. Before long, word went around the
corridors of the United States Attorney's office that the new
Attorney-General wanted the Seeger case pushed to a conclusion. The file was retrieved from the back of its drawer in a
storage cabinet and assigned to me. My instructions were to ignore the whiskers on the case-it was now more than four
years old-and try it.
I wrote defense counsel, telling them to get ready. They
were distressed, I'm sure, to hear that the case had suddenly
come to life, but there was nothing they could do about it. The
trial began on March 27, 1961, before Judge Thomas F. Murphy.
'To convict anyone of contempt, the Government must
prove that the defendant intentionally refused to answer questions he was obliged by law to answer. In essence, the law requires anyone called before Congress to answer Congress's
questions. If the questions are asked by a committee of Congress, the Government must prove that Congress properly delegated its authority to th~e committee. If the questions are asked
by a subcommittee of a committee, the Government must prove
that Congress properly delegated its authority to the committee
and that the committee in turn properly delegated its authority
to the subcommittee. Rather like tracing the course of a bubble
floating on the surface of the Mississippi from its source in
Lake Itasca to its debouchment into the Gulf of Mexico, the
prosecutor must show that authority descended from stage to
stage and finally transformed the question asked of the witness
into a question the witness was no longer legally free to decline
to answer.
When I first read the indictment, I was uneasy. It said that
on June 8, 1955, the Committee on Un-American Activities "directed that an investigation be conducted of Communist infiltration in the field of entertainment in New York" and that the

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:829

subcommittee that actually held hearings was "duly constituted
and authorized."
Couldn't it have been stated more precisely, I asked myself.
Turning to the bill of particulars, I was disturbed. Nothing in
paragraphs (f), (g), or (h) said that the Committee had authorized the subcommittee to hold hearings, and I thought it should
have said just that, in so many words. In the course of preparing for trial, I went to Washington to talk to the Committee's
director and counsel, Frank S. Tavenner. He assured me that
my concern was unnecessary. The Committee's files contained
the necessary authorization to the subcommittee, he remarked,
and he'd send it to me in a few days. He did.
Had I been a member of Congress, I would have cheerfully
voted to abolish the Committee on Un-American Activities. It
was, in my view, a mindless affront to the intellectual freedom
protected by the first amendment, but no one asked for my
views, and, in any event, they were irrelevant to my role as
prosecutor. What I might say as a lawyer trying a case had
nothing to do with what I might think as a citizen. Even so, my
plan for the trial was to prove the necessary elements of the
charge of contempt of Congress and nothing more. I would do
nothing to raise the issue of Seeger's membership in the Communist Party or his activity on behalf of Communist causes. I
would try the case solely on the basis of the law applicable to
such cases as laid down by the Supreme Court. No tub-thumping. But if defense counsel wanted to play that game, I'd be
ready to play, too.
I felt a slight increase of tension when I walked into the
courtroom to start the trial. Every seat was occupied. Seeger
had a large following, especially among young people, and
March 27, 1961, fell in the spring recess of most colleges and
universities in the East. For the first time, I was about to try a
case to a packed house.
Seeger's counsel was a distinguished New York lawyer
named Paul L. Ross, who, several years earlier, had run for
mayor on the ticket of the American Labor Party. I'd met him
in the course of restoring the case to life, and he now introduced me to Seeger, a tall, thin, pleasant-looking man.
Judge Murphy supervised the process of selecting a jury in
a no-nonsense manner, and within an hour the jury was
empanelled.
Proceeding directly to the opening statement, I told the
jury that the case involved neither Seeger's political beliefs nor
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his social philosophy. The only issue before you, I said, is
whether the defendant committed contempt by refusing to answer questions put to him by a properly authorized subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities. This case
does not involve whether or not the defendant is a member of
the Communist Party, I said in winding up. That should have
nothing whatsoever to do with your verdict.
Ross's opening statement was to the effect that the Committee on Un-American Activities merely wanted to keep Communists out of the entertainment industry, an objective
unrelated to any valid legislative purpose.
With that, the trial proper began.
The Court: Call your first witness.
Mr. Younger: May I begin by asking the Court to
take judicial notice of Section 121B(1Q) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946?
The Court: Yes, I will.
Mr. Younger: May I have your Honor's permission to read that to the jury?
The Court: Yes.
Mr. Younger: I am reading from Volume 60 of
the United States Statutes at Large, at page 828, Section 121B(1Q) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946 which deals with the powers and duties of committees of the House of Representatives.
"Committee on Un-American Activities.
"The Committee on Un-American Activities as a
whole, or by subcommittee, is authorized to make,
from time to time, investigations of (1) the extent,
character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within
the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a
domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of
government as guaranteed by our Constitution, (3) all
other questions in relation thereto that will aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation."
Your Honor, the Government calls Frank S.
Tavenner, Jr.
After Tavenner was sworn, I proceeded as follows:
Q. Mr. Tavenner, what is your present position?
A. I am Director of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives.

MINAESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:829

Q. How long have you held that position, sir?
A. Since September 1, 1960.
Q. Were you connected with the Committee prior
to that time?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. In what positions?
A. I have been counsel for the Committee for a
number of years.
Q. When did you become counsel for the
Committee?
A. I first became counsel May 1, 1949.
Q. I gather, then, that you were counsel for the
Committee in January of 1955?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell us which Congress of the United
States convened in January of 1955?
A. The Eighty-fourth Congress.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may I have this document marked for identification, please?
(Government Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibit 1 in evidence.
The Court: Received.
(Government Exhibit 1 for identification received
in evidence.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may I read Govern-.
ment Exhibit I in evidence to the jury?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Younger reads to the jury.)
Government Exhibit I was House Resolution 2 of the
Eighty-fourth Congress, passed January 5, 1955, attesting that
the House had convened and elected Sam Rayburn of Texas as
Speaker of the House.
Q. Mr. Tavenner, are you personally familiar
with the functions and duties of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Will you tell the Court and jury, briefly, what
those functions and duties are?
A. Well, the Speaker presides over the House
when it is in session. He determines, among many
other things, to what committee bills are to be referred
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which are introduced, and various business administrative features of the Congress.
Q. Is your answer applicable to the 84th
Congress?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I ask that this document be marked Government Exhibit 2 for identification, and may I have this document marked
Government Exhibit 3 for identification.
(Government Exhibits 2 and 3 marked for
identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibits 2 and 3 in evidence.
The Court: Both received.
(Government Exhibits 2 and 3 for identification received in evidence.)
Mr. Younger: Now, your Honor, may I read Government Exhibit 2 in evidence to the jury?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Younger reads to the jury.)
Government Exhibit 2 was a certificate attesting to the authenticity of Government Exhibit 3, the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
Mr. Younger: And, your Honor, may I read the
front cover of Government Exhibit 3 in evidence to the
jury?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Younger reads to the jury.)
Q. Mr. Tavenner, I hand you Government Exhibit 3 in evidence, the Rules of the House of the 84th
Congress, and I ask you whether or not those Rules
provide for the Committee on Un-American Activities?
A. Yes, sir, they do.
Q. Can you find the rule which specifically so
provides?
A. Here it is.
Q. Have you found it, sir?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What rule is that?
A. ' Rule 17. It is Rule 11, Section 17.
Q. Will you read that rule to the jury?
A. "Committee on Un-American Activities.
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Un-American Activities.

"(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to
make, from time to time, investigations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion
within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle
of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto
that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial
legislation."
Q. Mr. Tavenner, do you know whether or not
certain members of the House of Representatives of
the 84th Congress were designated to serve on the
Committee on Un-American Activities?
A. Yes, sir. I know that they were.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I ask that this be
marked Government Exhibit 4 for identification.
(Government Exhibit 4 marked for identification.)
Mr. Younger: I offer Government Exhibit 4 in
evidence.
The Court: I will receive it.
(Government Exhibit 4 for identification received
in evidence.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may I read Government Exhibit 4 in evidence to the jury?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Younger reads to the jury.)
Government Exhibit 4 was a certificate by the Clerk of the
House of Representatives listing the congressmen appointed to
the Committee on Un-American Activities for the Eightyfourth Congress.
Q. Mr, Tavenner, do you know whether or not
the Committee on Un-American Activities had adopted
its own rules of procedure to govern its work during
the 84th Congress?
A. Yes, it did.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I ask that this be
marked Government Exhibit 5 for identification.
(Government Exhibit 5 marked for identification.)
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Q. Mr. Tavenner, I hand you Government Exhibit 5 for identification. Will you tell the Court and
jury what that is?
A. This is a set of rules. It was reduced to writing by action of the committee in July of 1953-July
15th. It is composed of rules that had been in effect for
quite a period of time, and it is the first set of written
rules in the House of Representatives for any
committee.
Q. Were these rules in effect at the time of the
84th Congress?
A. They were.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibit 5 for identification in evidence.
The Court: I will receive it.
(Government Exhibit 5 for identification received
in evidence.)
Government Exhibit 5 was a copy of the Rules of the Committee on Un-American Activities.
Q. Mr. Tavenner, do you know whether or not
the Committee on Un-American Activities for the 84th
Congress passed a resolution authorizing the Chairman
to appoint subcommittees?
A. Yes, sir, it did, at the organizational meeting
of the 84th Congress.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may this be marked
Government Exhibit 6 for identification?
(Government Exhibit 6 marked for identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibit 6 for identification in evidence.
The Court: I will receive it.
(Government Exhibit 6 for identification received
in evidence.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may I read this exhibit to the jury?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Younger reads to the jury.)
Government Exhibit 6 was an excerpt from the Committee's minutes for January 20, 1955, reflecting the adoption of a
resolution pursuant to which the Committee authorized its
chairman to appoint subcommittees.
Q. By the way, Mr. Tavenner, referring to this
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resolution which has just been read to the jury and
which has been received as Government Exhibit 6 in
evidence, do you know whether or not a quorum of the
full Committee on Un-American Activities must be
present before the committee may pass such a
resolution?
A. Yes, sir. The quorum would be a majority.
Q. Do you know the source of that answer, sir?
A. I think it is in the rule itself.
Q. You mean the Rules of the House of
Representatives?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Tavenner, I note from the extract of the
minutes that you were personally present at the committee session on January 20, 1955.
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And can you tell us, from Government Exhibit 6 in evidence, whether a quorum of the committee was present?
The Court: It shows a quorum was present.
Mr. Younger: It does, on its face.
Your Honor, may this document be marked Government Exhibit 7 for identification.
(Government Exhibit 7 marked for identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibit 7 for identification in evidence.
The Court: Received.
(Government Exhibit 7 for identification received
in evidence.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may I read this exhibit to the jury?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Younger reads to the jury.)
Government Exhibit 7 was an excerpt from the Committee's minutes' for June 8, 1955, showing that the Committee directed the clerk of the Committee to investigate "communist
infiltration in the field of entertainment in New York."
Q. Now, Mr. Tavenner, Government Exhibit 7 in
evidence, the extract from the Committee minutes that
was just read to the jury, refers to an investigation of
Communist infiltration in the entertainment field. Do
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you know whether or not the investigation was carried
out?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Do you know whether or not hearings were
scheduled on that investigation in New York?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whether or not the Chairman of
the full Committee appointed a subcommittee to hold
those hearings?
A. Yes.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may this be marked
Government Exhibit 8 for identification?
A. (Continuing) It is my recollection that that
was done at a Committee meeting.
(Government Exhibit 8 marked for identification.)
Mir. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibit 8 in evidence.
Government Exhibit 8 was the Committee's authorization
to the subcommittee Tavenner had told me reposed in the
Committee's files. It was an excerpt from the Committee's
minutes for July 27, 1955, stating that "the hearings on communist infiltration in the entertainment field to be held in New
York City were set for August 15, 16, 17, and 18 and the subcommittee appointed." This was the authorization in so many
words whose absence from the bill of particulars had disturbed
me. I had no idea why the Committee hadn't sent it to the
United States Attorney's office in November 1957, when the
bill of particulars was prepared. The excerpt bore a verifying
certificate from the clerk of the House of Representatives dated
October 29, 1959. Tavenner had mailed the document to me
about two weeks before the start of the trial, and I'd given Ross
a copy.
Ross made the most of this exhibit.
Mr. Ross: If your Honor please, before I make an
objection to the admission of this document into evidence, I would like your Honor's permission to examine the witness concerning this particular exhibit.
The Court: Did he certify it?
Mr. Ross: I beg your pardon?
The Court: Did he certify it?
Mr. Ross: No, he did not certify it, but the fact of
the matter is that this exhibit does not contain or is
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not referred to in the bill of particulars furnished by
the government in connection with this case, and
under the circumstances the exhibit is not admissible
in evidence under all of the authorities that I have
been able to find.
The Court: Do you want a mistrial? Do you
plead surprise?
Mr. Ross: I don't want a mistrial. The question
here is the right of the government toThe Court: I would think the government is entitled to prove anything it has by way of establishing the
crime charged. You might be surprised by its proof because they did not tell you about it in the bill of particulars, and I suppose that you would be entitled to an
adjournment for that reason.
Mr. Ross: No, but he is testifying to this, and I
want to show the fact that we are prejudiced not particularly in reference to surprise, but in reference to
the right of the defendant to be informed at the earliest possible opportunity of those matters which the
government has and which are in the chain of proof to
establish his guilt, and here, for the first time, the government presents a resolution, a copy of which is only
furnished to me at my request with the other documents, I think, about two weeks ago.
The Court: You have had it for two weeks, have
you?
Mr. Ross: Yes, I have, your Honor, and there is
nothing that I was able to do about the question of the
authenticity of the certification. I feel that I have a
right to examine into the circumstances under which
this exhibit is presented for the first time to me two
weeks ago, and which is now offered to this court.
The Court: Let me see the resolution.
(A pause.)
The Court: The application is denied. Exhibit 8
is received in evidence.
Mr. Ross: May I reserve the right of cross-examination on this subject?
The Court: You may cross-examine when it is
your turn.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may I read Government Exhibit 8 in evidence to the jury?
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The Court: Yes.
Mr. Younger: In this case I ask your Honor's permission to read the Clerk's certification as well.
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Younger reads to the jury.)
Q. Now, Mr. Tavenner, do you know -whether or
not the hearings mentioned in the exhibit I just read to
the jury were actually held?
A. They were.
Q. When were they held, sir?
A. They began August 15th in New York City.
Q. Until when did they run?
A. I believe through the 18th.
Q. What year, sir?
A. Of 1955.
Q. Where in New York City were the hearings
held?
A. In this building, and it seems to me that it
must have been this room. I think I recognize the
layout.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may these documents
be marked Government Exhibits 9 and 10 for
identification.
(Government Exhibits 9 and 10 marked for
identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibits 9 and 10 in evidence.
The Court: I will receive them.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, at this time I propose
to read the defendant's testimony taken at that time to
the jury.
Government Exhibits 9 and 10 were the printed record of
the subcommittee's hearings in New York City on August 15,
16, 17, and 18, 1955. Tavenner and I read aloud Seeger's testimony before the subcommittee, Tavenner reading the questions
he himself had asked at the time, and I reading Seeger's
answers.
Ross began his cross-examination of Tavenner with Government Exhibit 8.
Q. Mr. Tavenner, you testified on direct examination, about the adoption of a resolution of July 27,
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1955, which was Government Exhibit 8. Do you recall
that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, the original book of entry of the Committee, is that a looseleaf book in which the minutes
are typed in or is it a bound volume?
A. It is a looseleaf volume.
Q. Now, was the original of this resolution, that
is of this transcript, does it contain other matters than
those which are referred to in the resolution itself
where the asterisks appear?
A. That is correct.
Q. So that this is a report of a meeting of the
Committee in which other matters were also handled?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a regular meeting of the Committee
or a special meeting? Would you know that?
A. It was a special meeting.
Q. Now, the special meeting-was that called on
particular notice in writing to the members of the
Committee?
A. Yes, sir, on written notice.
Q. Do you have any copy of the written notice
here?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Now, this resolution, Government Exhibit 8,
was not referred to in the opening statement [at the
subcommittee hearings] by the Chairman, was it?
A. I don't think it was.
Q. Can you recall whether or not you ever forwarded a copy of this resolution to the United States
Attorney's office?
A. No, but I did send it to the Clerk of the House
for certifying.
Q. And that was on or about the 29th day of October, 1959?
A. That is correct. But the Clerk couldn't get it
out, according to my recollection, until January,
though I was after him about once a week during the
intervening period.
Q. Well, now, it shows-
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The Court: Can't we cut this short? Are you trying to show that it was not before the grand jury?
Mr. Ross: Yes.
The Court: Mr. Younger, could you concede that
it wasn't before the grand jury, if the indictment was
in fact filed in 1957?
Mr. Younger: I think we can, your Honor.
The Court: Yes. All right.
Mr. Ross: The government concedes that it was
notThe Court: I think they would almost have to.
This is something that was certified in 1959, the indictment was filed in March, '57, you have trapped him,
yes.
Ross went on to questions about the Committee's interest
in black-listing Communists in the entertainment industry, to
none of which did Tavenner give an answer helpful to the
defense.
When the cross-examination was over, Tavenner left the
stand and I proceeded with proof that the procedural niceties
following Seeger's refusal to answer the subcommittee's questions had been observed.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may this document be
marked Government Exhibit 11 for identification?
(Government Exhibit 11 marked for identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibit 11 in evidence.
The Court: I will receive it.
(Government Exhibit 11 for identification was received in evidence.)
Government Exhibit 11 was an excerpt from the minutes
of the Committee on Un-American Activities for June 27, 1956,
showing that the Committee voted to ask the House of Representatives to cite Seeger for contempt.
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may this be marked
as Government Exhibit 12 for identification?
(Government Exhibit 12 marked for identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer Government
Exhibit 12 in evidence.
The Court: I will receive it.
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(Government Exhibit 12 for identification was received in evidence.)
Government Exhibit 12 was the report of the House of
Representatives entitled, "Proceedings against Peter Seeger."
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, may these documents
be marked Government Exhibits 13 and 14 for
identification?
(Government Exhibit 13 marked for identification.)
(Government Exhibit 14 marked for identification.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I offer in evidence
Government Exhibits 13 and 14.
The Court: I will receive them.
(Government Exhibit 13 for identification was received in evidence.)
(Government Exhibit 14 for identification was received in evidence.)
Government Exhibit 13 was House Resolution 636 of the
Eighty-fourth Congress, directing the Speaker to send the
House report on Seeger (Government Exhibit 12) "to the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
to the end that the said Peter Seeger may be proceeded against
in the manner and form provided by law."
I picked up Government Exhibit 14 and turned to the jury.
Mr. Younger: Ladies and gentlemen, Government Exhibit 14 reads as follows:
"The Speaker's rooms, House of Representatives, U.S., Washington,
D.C.
"To the United States Attorney, Southern District of New York.
"The undersigned, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
United States, pursuant to a House Resolution 636, Eighty-fourth
Congress, hereby certifies to you the refusal of Peter Seeger to answer questions before a duly constituted subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives
conducting an investigation authorized by Public Law 601, Seventyninth Congress, and House Resolution 5 of the Eighty-fourth Congress, as isfully shown by the certified copy of the report (House Report 2920) of said committee which is hereto attached.
"Witness my hand and the seal of the House of Representatives of the
United States, the City of Washington, District of Columbia, this

twenty-sixth day of July, 1956."

This document, ladies and gentlemen, is signed by Sam
Rayburn, the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Your Honor, the Government rests.
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The defense case consisted of six witnesses. Two of them
were asked about blacklisting and replied, in effect, that they
knew nothing about it. The other four were character witnesses, witnesses who testify that the defendant has a good reputation. (Since 1975, a character witness in a federal case has
also been permitted to testify to his own good opinion of the
defendant.)
Seeger's first character witness was Helen Parkhurst.
Direct examination by Mr. Ross:
Q. May I ask you, Doctor, please speak up? I
have difficulty hearing, as you know. What is your
occupation?
A. Editor, author and broadcaster.
Q. And what has been the nature of your associations as an editor? What schools have you been associated with?
A. I founded the Dalton School and I was head of
it from 1916 to 1942, at which time I went to Yale to be
a part of the department of education.
Q. And what have been your activities in connection with writing in the field of education?
A. I have written four books: Education on the
Dalton Plan, which is in sixteen languages; Works
Rhythms in Education; Exploring the Child§ World,
which is just recently in its seventh edition and was
published by the Department of Information-the
Agency of Information, in German, for dissemination
abroad to show the American way of life; Education on
the Dalton Plan,was the first one. I am currently engaged in writing two more which will be out this fall.
Q. Now, do you know Peter Seeger?
A. I know Peter Seeger.
Q. How long have you known him?
A. All his years, really. He was about one or two
when I first knew him.
Q. And did he at any time attend the Dalton
School?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Do you know his family?
A. I know his-I knew his grandparents, I knew
his father, I knew his mother, I knew his brothers. I
knew the whole family.
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Do you know other people who know him?
Yes, many people.
Now, do you know what his profession is?
Yes.

Q. Tell us.
A. I know of him as a musician and a singer.
Q. Now, are you familiar with his general reputation? Are you familiar with his general reputation?
A. Yes. Yes, I am.
Q. Well, are you familiar with the general reputation in the community in which he lives?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you familiar with his general reputation
in the professional circles in which he moves?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, will you tell us what his general reputation is as to character and integrity?
A. Excellent.
Q. Will you tell us what his general reputation is
for conducting himself as a law abiding citizen?
A. As far as I know, excellent.
Q. Will you tell us what his general reputation is
for loyalty and adherence to the principles of our
Constitution?
Mr. Younger: Objection.
The Court: No. I will allow that.
What is his reputation for loyalty and adherence
to the Constitution?
The Witness: Your Honor, I have asked many,
many people in different parts of the country and it is
excellent. It is excellent.
Mr. Ross: No further questions.
The last question and answer angered me. I'd wanted to
try the case without getting into Seeger's membership in the
Communist Party, and I thought I had done so. But through
Parkhurst's testimony about "loyalty and adherence to the
Constitution," Ross was suggesting to the jury that Seeger
wasn't a Communist. Though that was a game I didn't want to
play, if I had to I would.
In a case called Michelson v. United States,1 6 the Supreme
16. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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Court held that a character witness, who testifies to his knowledge of the defendant's reputation, may be asked whether he's
ever heard of some particular thing about the defendant tending to contradict what the character witness has said of the defendant's reputation. First, however, the prosecutor must show
the judge that the something he proposes to ask the character
witness about is probably true. This is what I did:
Mr. Younger: Mr. Ross, will you approach the
bench with me?
(Discussion at the bench.)
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, I will have only one
question on cross, but I will present it at the bench
first rather than in the jury's hearing.
I would ask this witness whether she ever heard
that Peter Seeger was a member of the Communist
Party. I think it is proper cross considering the last
question which was allowed.
The Court: I have to ask you whether you have
information which is a basis for asking that.
Mr. Younger: I will make that representation in
detail.
(In open court.)
The Court: We are going to take a short recess
and we will be back in five minutes.
(In the robing room.)
The Court: Would you repeat, again, your
statement?
Mr. Younger: Your Honor, what I am proposing
to ask this witness on cross-examination is the following question: Have you heard whether or not Peter
Seeger is a member of the Communist Party or was a
member in the period between 1948 and 1955?
The basis of this question is as follows: Your
Honor, Herman Thomas, an FBI informant, who testified for the Government in a Smith Act case in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania called United States
against Kuzma, this Mr. Thomas having been a member of the Communist Party as an undercover agent,
on September 12, 1949, identified Seeger as a member
of the Communist Party.
In addition, Lewis F. Budenz, formerly the managing editor of the Daily Worker and former Communist
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Party member, in 1949 identified Seeger as a member
of the Communist Party.
The Court: I will permit it.
(Jury present.)
(Witness Parkhurst resumed the stand.) Cross-examination by Mr. Younger:
Q. Dr. Parkhurst, you have testified that Peter
Seeger's reputation for loyalty and adherence to the
Constitution is excellent?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Dr. Parkhurst, have you ever heard that
Peter Seeger, sometime after 1947 and before 1956, was
a member of the Communist Party?
A. Recently.
The next two character witnesses were the producer of
Seeger's phonograph records and an Episcopalian priest from
Seeger's home town. I didn't cross-examine them.
The last character witness-and the last viitness in the
case-was Harold Taylor.
Direct examination by Mr. Ross:
Q. Dr. Taylor, where do you live?
A. In Bronxville, New York.
Q. What is your profession, sir?
A. An educator and author.
Q. Are you at the present associated with any educational institution?
A. No, I am not.
Q. Are you associated with any institution at all?
A. With the Institute for International Order.
Q. Prior to that were you associated with any educational institution?
A. Yes.
Q. What institution were you associated with?
A. Sarah Lawrence College.
Q. In what capacity?
A. As president.
Q. How long were you in that capacity?
A. From 1945 to 1959-14 years.
Q. During that period of time did you get to
know Peter Seeger?
A. Yes.
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Q. Did you see him frequently?
A. Two or three times a year.
Q. Do you know other people who know Peter
Seeger?
A. Yes, many.
Q. Have you talked with those people about Peter Seeger?
A. As one talks about one's friends, yes.
Q. Those people that you talked with, were they
people who were acquainted with him in connection
with his professional work and otherwise?
A. Some were, and some weren't.
Q. Are you familiar with his general reputation
in the professional circles in which he moves?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you tell us what his general reputation is
as to character and integrity?
A. Excellent.
Q. Will you tell us what his general reputation is
for conducting himself as a law-abiding citizen?
A. Excellent.
Q. Will you tell us what his general reputation is
for loyalty and adherence to the principles of our
Constitution?
A. Excellent.
Mr. Ross: Your witness. Cross-examination by Mr.
Younger:
Q. How long have you known Mr. Seeger?
A. Ten years, I would say.
Q. I gather then that you have been generally
aware of his reputation for about ten years?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever heard that Peter Seeger was a
member of the Communist Party between 1947 and
1956?
A. I have heard it stated.
Q. Still and all, you are prepared to state that his
reputation for loyalty and adherence to the Constitution is excellent, his reputation, sir?
There was a long pause, after which Taylor said, "Yes."
The final arguments were elaborate repetitions of the
opening statements. Judge Murphy charged the jury, explain-
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ing to them the laws on contempt of Congress. At 3:30 p.m.,
the jury began deliberating. At 4:55 p.m., they had a verdict.
Seeger was guilty on all counts of the indictment.
A week later, Seeger, Ross, and I were all before Judge
Murphy again.
Mr. Ross: The defendant is ready for sentence.
The Court: Yes. All right.
Mr. Younger: May I proceed, your Honor?
The Court: Stand up, Mr. Seeger.
Mr. Younger: May it please the Court, on March
29, 1961, which was Wednesday of last week, this defendant, Peter Seeger, was convicted by a jury on all
ten counts of an indictment charging contempt of Congress committed on August 18, 1955, in this city.
The statute under which this indictmen was
framed is Section 192 of Title 2, U.S. Code, and this
statute provides, in substance, that any person who refuses to answer proper questions posed by any committee of either House of Congress shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished, and now I am
quoting: "By a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less
than $100, and imprisonment in a common jail for not
less than one month nor more than twelve months."
The circumstances surrounding the commission of
this crime were developed by the Government in the
course of presenting its case at the trial, and I shall not
rehearse them here.
Instead I propose to bring to the Court's attention
those facts relevant to the question of sentence not
brought out at the trial.
Your Honor, Peter Seeger is 42 years old, having
been born in New York City in 1919. He has been
married for some 20 years and is the father of three
children.
At the present time he resides with his family in
Beacon, New York, and has done so for at least the last
six years.
The defendant graduated from grammar school
and high school in Connecticut, and attended Harvard
University from 1936 to 1938 but did not receive a
degree.
He served in the United States Army from 1942 to
1945 including more than one year of combat duty in
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the Pacific theatre. He received an honorable discharge with the rank of Technician 5th Grade.
Since 1945 or thereabouts Peter Seeger has earned
his living as a professional singer of folk songs, and,
except for the crime of which he now stands convicted,
the defendant has no criminal record.
Now, as your Honor knows, the defendant committed this crime by refusing .to answer questions put
to him by the Committee on Un-American Activities,
questions dealing with his Communist Party membership, his activities in behalf of the Cornmmunit Party,
and his responsiveness to Communist Party direction
and control.
Because it bears upon the gravity of this offense, I
would like to bring to your Honor's attention the information in the Government's possession concerning
these subjects.
Before doing so I wish to make clear tlat I am
aware that under present federal law mere membership in the Communist Party and participation merely
as an entertainer in Communist Party activities are not
crimes.
The information I have on these matters does,
however, indicate the extent to which the defendant
could have been of service to the Committee on UnAmerican Activities in the 'discharge of its duties had
he chosen to answer the Committee's questions. In
this sense this information bears upon the gravity of
the offense.
First with regard to Peter Seeger's Communist
Party membership, the government's information is as
follows:
In September, 1949, Herman Thomas, a Federal Bureau of Investigation undercover agent,
identified the defendant as a member of the Communist Party.
In 1950, John Lautner, formerly the Chairman
of the New York State Review Commission of the
Communist Party, stated that he knew Peter Seeger as a Communist Party'member in the period
1947 to 1949.
In addition to these men, Louis P. Budenz,
formerly the managing editor of the Daily Worker,
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has identified Peter Seeger as a member of the
Communist Party in 1949.
Now, if your Honor please, with regard to the defendant's participation as an entertainer at Communist
Party activities, the government's information is as
follows:
Between June, 1947, and October, 1955, Peter
Seeger appeared as a singer or as an entertainer
singing folk songs at a minimum of 24 separate
events sponsored by organizations designated by
the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order
10450, and which hence may fairly be described as
subversive.
I will not list these 24 events, but I wish to inform
your Honor of the names of some of the sponsoring
organizations:
The American Peace Crusade
The American Youth for Democracy
The California Labor School
The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern
Policy
The Families of the Smith Act Victims
The Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
The Jefferson School of Social Science
The Labor Youth League
The Communist Party itself.
This record, your Honor-and I refer not only to
the defendant's Communist activities but to his education and his upbringing as well-this record bespeaks
an individual who had a special obligation to provide
the information needed by the Committee in its investigation of Communist infiltration into the entertainment field.
By refusing to provide that information, by committing the crime for which he has been convicted, he
has not only placed himself in contempt of Congress
but has breached one of the most serious obligations of
American citizenship.
I concede that this was something strong coming from one
who himself would have voted to abolish the Un-American Activities Committee. Still, as I've pointed out, what a lawyer
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says ought not to be confused with what the lawyer personally
believes. Anyway, Ross had been the first to wave the flag.
The Court: Mr. Ross?
Mr. Ross: May it please the Court, I merely want
to refer to that portion of Mr. Younger's remarks
which deals with the alleged identification.
I think that the mere identification by Mr.
Thomas, which, I understand, was in a case in Philadelphia which was reversed by the Court of Appeals,
and by John Lautner, whose reputation for truthfulness has been questioned in many quarters, as well as
by Mr. Budenz, should not be taken by your Honor as
evidence of facts but merely as evidence of the fact
that these individuals so stated.
I might say with respect to Mr. Lautner that the
Court of Appeals, in the case of United States v.
Silverman, when it reversed the conviction, indicated
that Mr. Lautner, who was a witness for the Government, did not indicate that in any way any activities
which he observed in connection with his membership
in the Communist Party were illegal, subversive or of
a kind which did violence to the concepts of our Constitution. I merely wanted to place these matters in
the record.
Secondly, that as to any of the organizations referred to as organizations which were on the Attorney
General's list, I want to call your Honor's attention to
the fact that no final finding was made in connection
with these organizations until long after the events of
which Mr. Younger spoke.
And thirdly, that the Attorney General's list itself
was intended by the government, as I indicated to your
Honor, to be merely one of the factors which the government was to take into account in determining the
eligibility of persons for employment in the government, and it was never intended to be a source for proscription against an individual who otherwise
comported himself in a legal manner.
Now, with these remarks I leave the defendant to
your Honor's care.
The Court: Mr. Seeger, do you have anything to
say before I pass sentence on you?
Defendant Seeger: I do.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:829

The Court: You may.
Defendant Seeger: Thank you very much, your
Honor. After having heard myself talked about pro
and con for three days, I am very grateful for the opportunity to say a few words, unrestricted words,
myself.
Firstly, I want to thank my lawyer deeply for his
masterly preparation and presentation of my defense.
He has w6rked over long weeks and months, and done
all this knowing that it is beyond my power to pay him
adequately for his work.
I believe that he and great legal minds like Justice
Hugo Black and Dr. Alexander Michaelson, and
others, have stated far better than I can the reasons
that they believe that the First Amendment gives an
American citizen the right to refuse to speak upon certain occasions.
Secondly, I should like to state before this Court,
much as I stated before the Committee, my conviction
that I have never in my life said or supported or done
anything in any way subversive to my country.
Congressman Walter [the Committee's chairman]
stated that he was investigating a conspiracy. I stated
under oath that I had never done anything conspiratorial. If he doubted my word, why didn't he even question it? Why didn't he have me indicted for perjury?
Because I believe even he knew that I was speaking
the truth.
Some of my ancestors were religious dissenters
who came to America over 300 years ago. Others more
recently were abolitionists in New England in the
1840's and 50's, and I believe that in choosing my present course I do no dishonor to either them or to the
people who may follow me.
I will be 42 years old next month and I count myself a very lucky man. I have a wife and three healthy
children. We live in the house we built with our own
hands on the bank of the Hudson River, a very beautiful place.
For over 20 years I have been singing folk songs of
the American people and people of other lands to people everywhere. I am proud that I never refused to
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sing for any group of people because I might disagree
with some of the opinions held by some of them.
I have sung for rich and poor, for Americans of
every political and religious opinion and persuasion,
for every race, color and creed.
The House Committee wanted to pillory me because it didn't like some few of the many thousands of
places that I have sung. Now, it so happens that the
specific song whose title was mentioned in this trial
was not permitted to be sung at the time. It is one of
my favorites. The song is apropos to this trial, and I
wondered if I might have your permission to sing it
here before I close.
As he said this, Seeger bent down, reached under the counsel table, and pulled out his banjo. Without a pause, Judge
Murphy said, "You may not."
Seeger put the banjo on the table and continued:
Well, perhaps you will hear it some other time. A
good song can only do good, and I am proud of the
songs that I have sung. I hope to be able to continue to
sing them for all who want to listen to me, Republicans, Democrats, or Independents, for as long as I live.
Do I have a right to sing these songs? Do I have a
right to sing them anywhere?
The Court: Is that all you wish to say?
Defendant Seeger: It is, sir.
The Court: Would you want to tell me now
whether you are now or whether you ever were a
member of the Communist Party?
Defendant Seeger: I decline to speak.
The Court: Thank you.
The sentence of the Court is that you will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one year on each
count, to run concurrently, of which you stand convicted, and that you pay the cost of the prosecution,
and that is, I repeat, one year on each count, each
count to run concurrently, and the defendant should
pay the cost of the prosecution.
Mr. Ross: May I be heard, your Honor,
on an application to continue the defendant on bail pending
appeal?
The Court: No. I will deny that motion.
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Mr. Ross: Well, may I be heard on the question
before your Honor makes a final ruling?
The Court: Yes. I will hear you now.
Mr. Ross: There is no case that I know of involving contempt, the finding of contempt, against this or
any other committee of Congress, in which the court
has not granted bail pending appeal, particularly in
view of the fact of the very important legal questions
which are present in this case, and which I respectfully
submit were urged in good faith and ought to be heard
by the Court of Appeals.
The Court: Well, if the Court of Appeals want to
grant bail, you can go there; it is only a couple of floors
away.
Mir. Ross: Would your Honor permit him to remain on bail so that I can go to the Court of Appeals
today toThe Court: No. He is now committed.
Seeger picked up his banjo and handed it to his wife. With
a marshal at either arm, he was led away to the courthouse
lock-up where he spent no more than an hour in custody. His
lawyers went from Judge Murphy's courtroom to the Court of
Appeals, which granted their application for bail pending appeal. Seeger had dinner at home that evening.
The appeal was argued on April 9, 1962, and the Court of
Appeals filed its opinion six weeks later, reversing the conviction because the indictment failed to spell out the authority of
the subcommittee whose questions Seeger had refused to answer. The following passage is the crux of the Court of Appeals' opinion:
The first paragraph of the indictment purports to
relate the substance of a resolution passed by the Committee on Un-American Activities on June 8, 1955 directing the subcommittee to conduct the investigation.
The second paragraph then states that "pursuant to
said direction" the subcommittee conducted the hearings at which Seeger appeared as a witness. But the
resolution of June 8, 1955 (Government Exh. 9, p. 2260)
was not such an authorization to the subcommittee. It
was merely a direction to the parent Committee's clerk
to proceed with an investigation.... The resolution of
July 27, 1955 (Government Exh. 8), which actually purports to authorize the subcommittee to proceed with
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the hearings was nowhere mentioned. In other words,
instead of a "clear," "accurate" and "unambiguous" allegation of the essential facts indicating the subcommittee's authority, the indictment contained a wholly
misleading and incorrect statement of the basis of that
authority. This not only runs afoul of accepted notions
of fair notice, but goes "to the very substance of
whether or not any crime has been shown."

...

The possibility that a defendait might obtain this
essential information by means of a bill of particulars
does not affect our conclusion. A bill of particulars
cannot repair a fatal defect in an indictment, because
the defendant has a constitutional right to a fair and
accurate accusation by indictment; and there is no unconditional right to a bill of particulars. Furthermore,
in the instant case, although the trial court did order
the Government to specify the basis of the subcommittee's authority in a bill of particulars, the vital resolution of July 27, 1955 (Government Exh. 8) was not
produced in compliance with that order.17
That ended the Seeger case, and I wasn't disappointed. My
sympathies lay with Seeger. If I had been on the Court of Appeals, I would have voted with the other judges to reverse the
conviction, but I would have urged them to write a different
sort of opinion. In the Seeger case, the Court of Appeals
neither condemned the Un-American Activities Committee nor
acknowledged a witness's right to refuse to answer questions
about the witness's political beliefs and activities. The Court
based its reversal on a technical ground, a ground smacking of
pettifoggery. Had the Court chosen to write a more forthright
opinion, it would have said that the Committee's investigation
and Seeger's indictment were phenomena peculiar to the McCarthy days, that those days had come to an end, and that the
Court was not going to contribute to their revival even by so little as an affirmance of this conviction.
In July 1962, two months after the Court of Appeals' reversal of Seeger's conviction, I stood on a Fire Island beach with
my friend, Duck. I had caught the peg to first that put him out
in our championship game. I had stayed with his parents in
London before heading for Salzburg. Duck's father had been
on the edges of the Un-American Activities Committee's investigations in Hollywood.
17. Seeger, 303 F.2d at 484 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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"How could you," he asked. "How could you prosecute
Pete Seeger for doing what the Constitution gives him a right
to do?"
"That's not why the Court reversed his conviction," I said,
"though I agree with you that the Constitution gives him a
right to do what he did."
"Then how could you prosecute him?"
Trying to answer Duck, I struggled to explain my thoughts
on the responsibilities that go with being a trial lawyer. I spoke
for a good ten minutes. I don't remember the words I used, and
they probably weren't very good. But if I'd been able to, this is
what I would have said. I believe it still.
No trial lawyer hasn't been asked about the morality of
representing an evil client. The question goes as follows: "How
do you accommodate your own sense of right and wrong with
vigorous advocacy on behalf of someone or something loathsome?" The answer is that no accommodation is necessary. A
lawyer's own moral sense *requires of him nothing else but vigorous advocacy, without regard to the moral quality of the client or the cause. This exigent moral sense originates in the
lawyer's decision to be a professional advocate.
As Oliver Cromwell said to the General Assembly of the
Church of Scotland, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ,
think it possible that you may be mistaken." Life and the affairs of living are so tangled, the world not 'only stranger than
we imagine but stranger than we can imagine, that all questions
are conundrums, no answers "correct." It is certain that parallel lines never meet? No. Does water freeze at thirty-two degrees fahrenheit? Only probably. Shall I marry? Who can
say? And yet the world's work must be done. One Oblomov is
enough. Thus we learn a conventional certitude, acting as
though all were light by blinking the shadow. A simple proof
demonstrates that parallel lines meet, but, on the assumption
that they do not, the architect builds the skyscraper. Despite
his knowledge of statistical mechanics, the engineer designs the
refrigerator to maintain a constant temperature of thirty-one
degrees. Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait
point,1 8 and families are raised.
Still, a feigned composure sometimes goes slack. After a
while, the struggle to stay afloat seems too hard, and the uncertainty of things laps high. To think is to suffer this fear and
18.

"The heart has its reasons which reason cannot understand."

1989]

FEDERAL PROSECUTION

trembling. Hence members" of the three professions are
afflicted.
The physician is master of medicine. This afternoon he
saved a life. But the life is the life of Hitler. Was he worth saving? Would it not have been better to let him die?
The clergyman has learned the cure of souls. This afternoon he solaced one in terror. But the one in terror is a Manson. Was he worth comforting? Would it not have been better
to leave him to his agony?
The lawyer, as Samuel Johnson puts it, "ha[s] acquired the
art and power of arranging evidence and of applying to the
points at issue what the law has settled."'19 This afternoon by
his advocacy he persuaded a jury to return a verdict of not
guilty. But the client is noxious. Was the verdict worth winning? Wotild it not have been better for. the lawyer to decline
to involve himself in the case?
None of these questions has a sure answer. Perhaps one
should save a Hitler, shrive a Manson, defend a guilty client; or
perhaps not. There is no way to tell, and the very inquiry may
be nothing more than a trick of our nervous system, organized
as it is on the algorithm of either/or.
All of us, however, from time to time need the skill of one
or the other of the three professions. I am sick: I want health.
I am troubled: I want tranquility. I have a case: I want to be
heard. The physician, the clergyman, and the lawyer are
trained to help me accomplish my desires, but should they stop
to ask whether it is good that it be done-whether my body deserves the healing, my soul the calming, my case the hearingthey will never find a sure answer and, in their doubt, lose the
name of action.
The professions do not relish this prospect, nor can society
abide it: society stands too much in need of the physician, the
clergyman, and the lawyer to tolerate their impotence. Each of
the professions therefore demands of its members a commitment that will permit them to do the job for which they have
been trained. It is a commitment of the greatest difficulty, and
its difficulty lies precisely in the acknowledgement that, since
one's own moral sense may impede professional practice, a professional practitioner must put aside his own moral sense. It is,
accordingly, a commitment to make no moral judgments. It is a
19. 5 J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 26-27 (G. Hill & L. Powell 3d ed. 1934-50).
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commitment to assume a certainty willed but possible (rather
than seek a certainty reasoned but impossible) that the life is
worth saving, the soul worth calming, the case worth hearing.
The physician's commitment is embodied in the Hippocratic Oath:
"The regimen I adopt shall be for the benefit of my patients ...

and

not for their hurt... Whatsoever house I enter, there will I go for the

benefit of the sick."
The clergyman's commitment is embodied in Paul's advice
to the Romans:
'Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto
wrath: for it is written, Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the
Lord." 20

The lawyer's commitment is embodied in no single document, but inheres in the lawyer's obligation to give any client
and any cause his advocacy, regardless of his own moral judgment, because the question whether the client or the cause deserves a hearing is too profound for men to answer.
When I finished talking to Duck, he looked down, dug at
the sand with his foot, and said, "It doesn't make sense to me
and I don't understand it. The fact is you're the guy who prosecuted Pete Seeger. That's a guy I don't want to know. This
friendship is over." I haven't seen him since that day.

20. Romans 12:19 (King James).

